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Classified by SP1AG/TAM  
Declassify on: OADR 47-89  
#296 598  
NUMEROUS REFERENCE

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: John Von Neumann  
Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room 670  
# 124 Date 10 5 54 Searcher Initial 184

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

- ✓ Von Neumann John
- ✓ 80-728-56 ND
- ✓ I 150-344012-4
- ✓ 16-0-1153 ND
- ✓ 100-171733-2 ND
- ✓ I 40-29766-3 ND
- ✓ 100-171732-1 ND
- ✓ Von Neumann John
- ✓ 65-58805-13
- ✓ 100-366605-43 IV
- ✓ SI 65-59028-1102-b-1
- ✓ [REDACTED] (S)
- ✓ SI 70 100-344012-4  
721-33227-2
- ✓ 100-190625-2557 p 90.20
- ✓ SI 100-344012-113  
100-372172-36503.7104
- ✓ Von Neumann John
- ✓ I [REDACTED] (S)

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#2961598  
Classified by SP6/TAM  
Declassify on: OADR 4-7-89  
SEARCH SLIP

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
R# (120) Date 3.5.54 Searcher Initials [redacted]

FILE NUMBER	cont	SERIAL
<u>✓ L</u>	<u>John Neumann</u>	<u>6a</u>
<u>✓ L</u>	<u>61-7341 sub 11-194 p 6</u>	<u>288 p 3</u>
<u>✓ I</u>	<u>65-58805-649</u>	
<u>✓ L</u>	<u>100-89-197 p 4 ND</u>	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ NI</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ I</u>	<u>65-59104-110 ND</u>	
<u>✓ I</u>	<u>100-344655</u>	
<u>✓ I</u>	<u>100-347825-58 p 9</u>	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ NR</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ L</u>	[redacted]	(S) b-1
<u>✓ I</u>	[redacted]	
<u>✓ I</u>	[redacted]	(S) 12

ALL  
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-89 BY SP1/AG/TAC  
SEARCH SLIP # 296598

Supervisor John Don Room 184  
Date 10-5-54 Searcher Initial [redacted]

R#

FILE NUMBER

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
105-12140-27	2435
105-13897-4	
116-2713-48	ND
116-2713-2027	1745
1683-1229	1534
1630	
133-175	17 ND
117-833-377	ND
116-14376-10	
121-32545-3	ND
121-1-521	ND
100-346	
[redacted]	
100-130625-28	
116-37828-5	

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(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

Subj: HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/1/89 BY SP1 AG/AM



Supervisor #296599 Room

R# 204 Date Searcher Initial

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
Von Neuman, John R	
✓ SL 100-346208-114	
✓ I 116-361512-5 ND	
✓ VI 100-342972-1120 ND	
✓ Von Neumann, John J 100	
✓ 100-3...-15	
✓ Von Neumann, John	
✓ 100-778	
✓ 1813, 1630, 2027, 1809	
✓ 1534	
✓ 65-59124-10 ND	
✓ 105-12140-24	
✓ 116-2713-48 ND	
✓ 100-3...05	
✓ 117-0-198 ND	(H)
✓ 100-359672-30	
✓ 100-3...972-...	



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NUMEROUS REFERENCE  
Classified by SP1/MLT 4/17/89 #296598  
Declassify on: OS SEARCH SLIP

Subj: John Von Neumann  
Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
# 304 Date 0-5-54 Searcher Initial 180

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

Von Neumann, John

- VI 105-13906-2 ND
- SI 100-346208-114
- VI 105-13897-4 ND
- VI 121-32545-3 ND
- VI 100-30597-17
- VI 117-833-398 ND
- VI 121-1-521 ND
- VI [REDACTED]
- VI 100-92526-981
- SI 100-342772-1195
- VI 121-0-2169
- VI 116-37888-5 ND (5)
- VI 100-346921-60 ND
- VI 100-345957-2 ND
- VI 120-65-881 ND
- VI 100-190625-2864

b1

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
NUMEROUS REFERENCE  
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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED # 296598 4-2a  
 DATE 9/26/81 BY SP1AG/THM

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 R# 150 Date 8 5 81 Searcher Initial 18

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

- ✓ John P. U. Neumann
- ✓ NR
- ✓ Von Neumann
- ✓ NR
- ✓ 100-190625-1996 John
- ✓ NR
- ✓ Von Neumann J
- ✓ NR
- ✓ John Van Neuman Var
- ✓ I 65-59104-X7 ND
- ✓ John Von Neuman (Var)
- ✓ L 100-190625-1996, 1853, 60
- ✓ I 65-33025-2 ND (6)
- ✓ SI 70-1000-978
- ✓ John Neuman (Var)
- ✓ NR
- ✓ SI 116-132852 35 11

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4 22a

DATE 4/1/89 SEARCHED BY DIAGRAM # 296598

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_


R# 100 Date 0.5.58 Searcher Initial 18

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

John Neuman (var)

- V 100 - 362903 - 1 ND
- V 100 - 17828 - 208
- VL 116 - 30744 - 9 ND
- V John Von Neuman (var)
- VI 40 - 6999
- ✓ J V Neuman (var)
- ✓ NR
- ✓ J von Neuman (var)
- ✓ NR
- ✓ Von Neuman (var)
- ✓ NR
- ✓ Johann Von Neumann (var)
- V 100 - 342 972 - 710 p 34 ND
- ✓ Johann Neuman (var)
- VI 64 - 200 - 232 - 460, 351 p1
- V 105 - 9009 - 7 ①



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/1/94 BY SP1AG/TAM  
SEARCH SLIP # 296598

4-22a

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor: \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
R# 100 Date 10-5-57 Search Initials [Redacted]

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

✓	<u>Von Neumann, John (Var)</u>	
✓	<u>105-10474-11</u>	
✓	<u>116-8793-71 ND</u>	
✓	<u>101-1403-185</u>	
✓	<u>100-190625-60 ND</u>	<u>ND 175-199</u>
✓	<u>65-33085-2</u>	
✓	<u>Von Neumann, J (Var)</u>	
✓	<u>100-352587-15 ND</u>	
✓	<u>Von Neumann, John R (Var)</u>	
✓	<u>100-344686-7 Summary</u>	<u>(18-50)</u>
✓	<u>100-342972-710 ND</u>	<u>34</u>
✓	<u>Von Neumann, John R</u>	<u>(Var)</u>
✓	<u>100-190625-2031 ND</u>	
✓	<u>Von Neumann, John</u>	
✓	<u>116-14376-14 ND</u>	
✓	<u>Von Neumann, J (Var)</u>	
✓	<u>120-65-969 ND</u>	<u>15</u>

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4/11/94 BY SP1AG/AM  
NUMEROUS REFERENCE 4-22a

SEARCH SLIP #296598

Subj: John Von Neumann 236

Supervisor [redacted] Room 4740

# [redacted] Date 5-57 Initial 184

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

- no alphabetical
- ✓ VI 40-10354 ND
  - ✓ VI 40-14106 ND
  - ✓ VI 100-344686 I
  - ✓ V 116-1914 I
  - ✓ Bu. [redacted] [redacted]
  - ✓ of matrices of Herb Ord
  - ✓ VI 40-29766-3 ND
  - ✓ V 96-0-1153 ND
  - ✓ I 100-171733-4 I
  - ✓ VI 40-10354.3 ND
  - ✓ V 121-23278-267X12 p184
  - ✓ VI 100-342972-11743
  - ✓ VI 100-345958-2 ND I
  - ✓ John V Neumann
  - ✓ VI 100-346208-109 ND (9)
  - ✓ John R Von Neumann
  - ✓ VI 100-342972-1120 XI

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# 296598

Classified by SP16/LLP <sup>NUMEROUS REFERENCE</sup>  
Declassify on: OADSEARCH SLIP

4-22a

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_

R# 904 Date 10-5-54 Searcher Initial 184

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

John R Neumann

V ✓ 100 - 346 - 58 - 114 SI

V ✓ 116 - 361512 - 5 ND

John Neumann

AK [REDACTED]  
AK [REDACTED]  
AK [REDACTED]  
AK [REDACTED]

b-1

(S) ✓ [REDACTED]

V ✓ 100 - 366235 - 3 6/15/57

AK [REDACTED]

V ✓ 100 - 359672 - 30 ND

V ✓ 121-0 - 2169 ND

V ✓ 65 - 59104 - 16 12



V ✓ 100 - 345992 - 19 ND

✓ 100 - 344052 Sub 174 Work Ctr. 1  
7/28/54

✓ 100 - 74450 - 11 ND (10) 2

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/1/81 SEARCHED BY SP1AG/TAM  
NUMEROUS REFERENCE  
# 296598  
4-22a

Subj: John Von Neumann  
Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
R# 204 Date 0.5.57 Searcher Initial 184

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
✓	<u>Johann Neumann</u> <sup>cont</sup> <u>War</u>	
✓	[REDACTED]	
✓	<u>Johan Neuman</u> <u>war</u>	
✓	[REDACTED]	
✓	<u>John Von Neumann</u>	
✓	<u>100-190623-2031</u> <u>ND</u>	
✓	<u>100-342972-710</u> <u>234</u>	
✓	<u>John V O Neumann</u>	
✓	<u>NR</u>	
✓	<u>John Von Neumann</u> <u>War</u>	
✓	<u>NR</u>	
✓	<u>John V Neumann</u> <u>War</u>	
✓	<u>NR</u>	
✓	<u>John Neumann</u> <u>War</u>	
✓	[REDACTED]	
✓	<u>121-0-2168</u>	(11)
✓	[REDACTED]	6

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

4-22a

DATE 4/1/54 SEARCH SLIP AG/TAM  
# 296598

Subj: John Von Newman

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_  
R# 204 Date 0.5 Searcher Initial IP

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

✓ John Newmann (var)

~~NR~~ [REDACTED]  
~~NR~~ [REDACTED]  
~~NR~~ [REDACTED]

✓ John Von Newman

✓ 100-344686-4

✓ 100-342972-718 per 20

✓ John Newman see also with  
man 1-3-54

~~NR~~ 31-27301 per 20 [REDACTED]

~~NR~~ [REDACTED]  
~~NR~~ [REDACTED]  
~~NR~~ [REDACTED]

~~NR~~ [REDACTED]

✓ 100-344662-2 per 20 116

~~NR~~ [REDACTED]

✓ Three broken down in means Lib see  
see also with 116 man id 1-3-54

ALL  
b7c

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_

R# 204 Date 10.5.57 Searcher Initial [redacted] 185

FILE NUMBER

SERIAL

✓ Von Neumann, John

✓ 100-17828-2008 SF 2184

✓ 100-362903-1

✓ 100-341825-58 p 9 ND

✓ 65-59104-Y10 ND

Von Neumann, John

✓ 100-344152-2184 Wood City 2184

✓ all breakdowns under 2184

✓ Von Newman and Van Neumann are MR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/7/89 BY SP1AG/TAM  
#296598

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4-22a

#201/98

NUMEROUS REFERENCE

Classified by 5010/1/89

Declassify on: ~~SEARCH SLIP~~

Subj: John Von Neumann

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_

R# 204 Date 10-5-54 Searcher Initial 18

FILE NUMBER b-1 SERIAL \_\_\_\_\_

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

J.V. Neumann

100-171733-12 ND

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

J Von Neumann

100-11262-2409/2525576

100-342972-710/34

100-347660-18 ND

105-13841-4/5 ND

J R Neumann

MR

J R V Neumann

MR

J R Von Neumann

MR (15)

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SEARCH SLIP

Subj: John Von Neuman

Supervisor \_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED Searched 784  
Date 6 5 5 1984

DATE 4/1/84 FILE NUMBER # 296594 SERIAL \_\_\_\_\_

Von, John

MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]

✓ Van John

MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]

MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]

MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]

MI [REDACTED] (b)  
MI [REDACTED]  
MI [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 7 1954

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TELETYPE

FBI WASH DC                      10-7-54                      4-26 PM                      NOX  
SAC, ALBUQUERQUE              SAN FRANCISCO              URGENT

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL OCTOBER FOUR. WHITE HOUSE  
HAS REQUESTED CASE BE EXPEDITED. IMPERATIVE URREP REACH  
BUREAU ON OR BEFORE DEADLINE DATE WITHOUT FAIL.

HOOVER

AQ KX NK BA NY AND SF AND WFO ADVISED

END AND ACK PLS.

AQ OK FBI AQ DFB

SF OK FBI SF IDA

TU DISCM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 7 1954

b7c

TELETYPE

BALTIMORE 1 NEW YORK 10 NEWARK 3 FROM WASH DC 7 4-40 PM  
SAC, URGENT

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL OCTOBER FOUR. WHITE HOUSE  
HAS REQUESTED CASE BE EXPEDITED. IMPERATIVE URREP REACH  
BUREAU ON OR BEFORE DEADLINE DATE WITHOUT FAIL.

HOOVER

AQ KX NK BA NY AND SF AND WFO ADVISED

END AND ACK PLS.

NY WA R10 NY PXM

BA WA R 1 BA NSH

NK WA R 3 NK EJT

TU DISC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT

TELETYPE

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FBI WASH DC 10-7-54 4-50 PM NOS

SAC, KNOXVILLE URGENT

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL OCTOBER FOUR. WHITE HOUSE  
HAS REQUESTED CASE BE EXPEDITED. IMPERATIVE URREP REACH  
BUREAU ON OR BEFORE DEADLINE DATE WITHOUT FAIL.

HOOVER

AQ KX NK BA NY AND SF AND WFO ADVISED

END AND ACK PLS.

OK FBI KX BB

TU DISC

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OCTOBER 7, 1954

URGENT

SAC, ALBUQUERQUE  
KNOXVILLE  
NEWARK  
BALTIMORE  
NEW YORK  
SAN FRANCISCO  
WASHINGTON FIELD (DCS)

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL OCTOBER FOUR. WHITE HOUSE  
HAS REQUESTED CASE BE EXPEDITED. IMPERATIVE URREP REACH  
BUREAU ON OR BEFORE DEADLINE DATE WITHOUT FAIL.

HOOVER

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
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- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Parsons \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 7 1954  
TELETYPE



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77-64804-3

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

007 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____
9-20P	_____

WASHINGTON AND WASH FIELD 15 NEWARK 2 FROM NEW YORK  
DIRECTOR AND SACS

7

.....U R G E N T.....

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL OCTOBER FOUR. ARTICLE IN "NEW YORK POST" JUNE SIXTEEN, FIFTY FOUR, INDICATES APPOINTEE TESTIFIED AT HEARING CONDUCTED OF DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER BY AEC BOARD WHICH RESULTED IN OPPENHEIMER-S SUSPENSION AS SECURITY RISK. ARTICLE INDICATES THAT IN CONNECTION WITH OPPENHEIMER-S FAILURE TO REPORT HAAKON CHEVALIER AS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO TRIED TO SECURE FROM HIM ATOMIC INFORMATION FOR RUSSIANS IN FORTY THREE, VON NEUMANN TESTIFIED "YOU HAVE TO VIEW THE PERFORMANCE AND THE CHARACTER OF A MAN AS A WHOLE. THIS EPISODE WOULD MAKE ME THINK THAT IN NINETEEN FORTY TWO AND FORTY THREE HE WAS NOT EMOTIONALLY AND INTELLECTUALLY PREPARED TO HANDLE THIS KIND OF A JOB, THAT HE SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED HOW TO HANDLE IT AND HANDLED IT VERY WELL, I KNOW." WFO REVIEW AND REPORT PERTINENT TESTIMONY OF VON NEUMANN BEFORE AEC BOARD. NEWARK DEVELOP AND REPORT ASSOCIATION OF APPOINTEE AND OPPENHEIMER.

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77-64804-5

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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUREAU**

REPORT MADE AT <b>ALBUQUERQUE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/8/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/8/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>[REDACTED]</b> <span style="float: right;">b7C</span>
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN, aka, John R. Von Neumann</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY WHITE HOUSE</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Dr. JOHN VON NEUMANN retained as consultant to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, November 2, 1943 to present. Highly recommended by associates at Los Alamos as to professional capability and as to character, loyalty, associates and trustworthiness. No credit or criminal record at Los Alamos or Santa Fe, N. M.

- RUC -

REFERENCE: Bureau teletype to Albuquerque dated October 4, 1954.

DETAILS: The title of this case has been modified to include the name of JOHN R. VON NEUMANN as reflected by personnel records of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Investigation at Los Alamos, New Mexico, was conducted by SA **[REDACTED]** and at Santa Fe, New Mexico by SA **[REDACTED]**

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EMPLOYMENT

At Los Alamos, New Mexico

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L

**[REDACTED]**

APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <b>[REDACTED]</b>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE <b>[REDACTED]</b>	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
COPIES OF THIS REPORT ② - Bureau (AMSD) 1 - Albuquerque (77-485)		77-64804-10 NOT RECORDED OCT 11 1954 [REDACTED]	
		b7C	

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that he has known Doctor JOHN VON NEUMANN since [REDACTED]. He stated that within such period he has had both professional and social contacts with VON NEUMANN whenever he has been at Los Alamos. He has also served on a number of different scientific committees with Doctor VON NEUMANN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he has "the very highest regard" for the professional capability of Doctor VON NEUMANN and also the highest regard for his integrity, character, loyalty and trustworthiness. He continued that he has the highest degree of confidence in VON NEUMANN and that he would recommend him without qualification for any position of trust with the United States Government.

[REDACTED] advised that he has known Doctor JOHN VON NEUMANN since [REDACTED]. During such period he has had intermittent contact with VON NEUMANN at Los Alamos and other places both on a professional and a social basis. [REDACTED] he has the highest respect for VON NEUMANN and that he considers the attitude of VON NEUMANN toward "Security Matters" to be very commendable. He stated that he feels certain that VON NEUMANN is "anti-Communitic" in his political belief, but that he does not exhibit any appreciable interest, or become involved, in political matters. [REDACTED] recommended VON NEUMANN highly as to character, reputation, loyalty, and professional capability. He stated that when Doctor VON NEUMANN is at Los Alamos he associates only with individuals who hold very responsible positions in connection with the laboratory and with "top" people in the theoretical field.

[REDACTED] he is also quite well acquainted with Mrs. KLARA VON NEUMANN and considers her to be

AQ 77-485

of excellent character and reputation and completely loyal to the United States and the Democratic form of government. He added that when Doctor VON NEUMANN and his wife are in Los Alamos they always reside in temporary quarters at The Lodge.

NEIGHBORHOOD

At Los Alamos, New Mexico

b7C  
b7D [REDACTED] He stated he believes the VON NEUMANNs to be of good character and reputation, but that he does not know them well enough to comment on their loyalty to this country. He added, however, that nothing unfavorable concerning them has ever come to his attention.

CREDIT RECORD

At Santa Fe, New Mexico

[REDACTED] which covers Los Alamos, New Mexico, advised that records of that agency do not contain any information relative to Doctor JOHN VON NEUMANN or his wife, Mrs. KLARA VON NEUMANN.

CRIMINAL RECORD

At Santa Fe, New Mexico

b7D The records of [REDACTED] were checked with negative results and they do not contain any information relative to Doctor VON NEUMANN or his wife.

At Los Alamos, New Mexico

[REDACTED] Records of [REDACTED] were checked with negative results and they do not reflect any information relative to Doctor JOHN VON NEUMANN or his wife, KLARA DAN VON NEUMANN.

MISCELLANEOUS

At Los Alamos, New Mexico

The files of the AEC Security Branch at Los Alamos

AQ 77-485

were reviewed and do not contain any pertinent information relative to JOHN VON NEUMANN or his wife, KLARA DAN VON NEUMANN, except as previously reported.

- RUC -

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

b7c

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE (77-485)  
SUBJECT: JOHN VON NEUMANN, aka  
JOHN R. VON NEUMANN  
SPECIAL INQUIRY - WHITE HOUSE

DATE: 10/8/54

b7c

Re Bureau teletype to Albuquerque dated 10/4/54.

b7c

There is transmitted herewith two copies of report of SA [redacted] dated 10/8/54, at Albuquerque, titled as captioned above.

The attention of the Bureau is respectfully directed to report of SA [redacted] dated 12/8/53, at Albuquerque, entitled JOHN VON NEUMANN; AEA-E (Bureau File 116-1914), which reflects that the below identified individuals have been named as particular social associates of VON NEUMANN at Los Alamos, New Mexico, over a period of years.

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]
5. [redacted]

The Bureau is in possession of some previously reported derogatory information relative to all of these individuals, full details of which are not available to the Albuquerque office at this time.

- C -

b7c

AIR MAIL  
SPECIAL DELIVERY

2 ENCL

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117-64804-4  
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b7c

ATTN: SPECIAL INQUIRY SECTION

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

**b7c**

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT

BUREAU

REPORT MADE AT <b>BALTIMORE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/8/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/4,6,7,8/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY 
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b> <b>b7c</b>	

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Applicant currently employed as consultant for Ballistics Research Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Associates at Aberdeen Proving Ground state no question of applicant's character, loyalty, reputation or associates. Credit and criminal negative.

- RUC -

**REFERENCE:** **b7c**  
 Report of SA Baltimore, Maryland dated April 8, 1947;  
 Report of SA Baltimore, Maryland dated September 17, 1953;  
 Bureau teletype dated October 4, 1954;  
 Bureau teletype dated October 7, 1954.

**DETAILS:**

EMPLOYMENT

AT ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND

**b7c**  
 Civilian Personnel Division, advised that the appointee's appointment as a consultant was extended on July 1, 1954

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1 Baltimore (116-213)		OCT 11 1954	

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Ba. (116-213)

for a term not to exceed thirty days in fiscal year 1955 and not to extend beyond June 30, 1955.

*AKK*  
*b7C*  
*b7D*  
[REDACTED] Ballistics Research Laboratories, advised that VON NEUMANN continues in his capacity as a consultant for the laboratories and that they continue to consider him a person of high moral character, reputable associates, excellent reputation and undoubtedly loyal to this country.

CREDIT AND CRIMINAL

[REDACTED] Maryland, advised that there are no records in their respective offices for the appointee or his wife. Aberdeen, Maryland is in Harford County. There is no established credit bureau in Harford County.

[REDACTED] advised SEs [REDACTED] respectively, that they were unable to locate any records for the appointee or his wife.

MISCELLANEOUS

*b7C*  
[REDACTED] Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, advised that no information reflecting adversely on the character, reputation, loyalty or associates of the appointee has been brought to the attention of the Post Intelligence Officer.

- RUC -

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b7c

Form No. 1  
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT BUREAU

REPORT MADE AT NEW YORK	DATE WHEN MADE 10/8/54	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 10/4-8/54	REPORT MADE BY 
TITLE JOHN VON NEUMANN			CHARACTER OF CASE SPECIAL INQUIRY <span style="float: right;">b7c</span>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Article in "New York Post" indicates appointee testified at hearing conducted of DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER by AEC Board. Information in newspaper article regarding appointee's testimony set out. No credit record appointee and relatives. No criminal record, appointee's daughter, MARIANA VON NEUMANN, Setauket, N.Y. No criminal record appointee and relatives, NYC.

- RUC -

REFERENCE:

Bureau teletypes to New York, 10/4/54 and 10/7/54.

DETAILS:

Miscellaneous

The "New York Post", a daily newspaper, under date of June 16, 1954, carried an article written by WILLIAM V. SHANNON headed "OPPENHEIMER Appeal Denies Stand Caused Delay in Building H-Bomb". This article indicates that DR. JOHN VON NEUMANN, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study and a member of the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Commission, testified at the hearing conducted of DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER by the Atomic Energy Commission Board, which hearing resulted in OPPENHEIMER'S suspension as a security risk. The

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NY 77-19335

article states that in connection with OPPENHEIMER'S failure to report HAAKON CHEVALIER as the person who tried to secure from him atomic information for the Russians in 1943, VON NEUMANN testified, "You have to view the performance and the character of a man as a whole. This episode would make me think that in 1942 and 1943, he was not emotionally and intellectually prepared to handle this kind of a job; that he subsequently learned how to handle it, and handled it very well, I know."

Credit

ALL  
b7C  
b7D  
[REDACTED] advised SE [REDACTED] that her records contained no information concerning appointee, his mother, MARGARET VON NEUMANN, brother, MICHAEL VON NEUMANN, or daughter, MARIANA VON NEUMAN.

Criminal

SA [REDACTED] caused the records of [REDACTED] to be checked by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Magistrate's Court, City of New York. No record was located for appointee or his above-named relatives.

During an applicant type investigation of appointee's former wife, MARIETTE K. KUPER, in 1954, it was indicated that appointee's daughter, MARIANA VON NEUMANN, resided with Mrs. KUPER on West Meadow Road, Setauket, New York.

[REDACTED] New York, which New York, advised SA [REDACTED] that she had no arrest record for MARIANA VON NEUMANN.

NY 77-19335

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

MISCELLANEOUS

The Bureau's attention is directed to the following:

b7c


[REDACTED]

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION




b7c

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUREAU**

REPORT MADE AT <b>SAN FRANCISCO</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/8/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/6,7,8/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY 
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b> <span style="float: right;">b7c</span>	


**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**



Employment at  set forth.  considerable contact since last interview and advised nothing additional to add. Recommended as to character, loyalty, ability, associates and patriotism.  Radiation Laboratory, advise VON NEUMANN of excellent reputation as a scientist. No credit or criminal record maintained.

-RUC-

REFERENCE: Bureau teletype to San Francisco dated 10/4/54.

DETAILS: AT BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA:



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b7c

[redacted] advised that he has had considerable recent contact with VON NEUMANN and that he had nothing additional to add to the previous statement furnished in 1953. [redacted] recommended VON NEUMANN highly as to his character, loyalty, patriotism, associates and ability as a scientist.

b7c  
b7D

[redacted] stated he had some professional contact with VON NEUMANN over a considerable period of time, but that he has not had much social contact with him. [redacted] he considers VON NEUMANN one of the most brilliant scientists in the world, and that he has an excellent reputation in the profession. [redacted] that he has had no reason to question VON NEUMANN's character, loyalty to the United States, or his patriotism in any way, and that lack of information prevents him from commenting farther.

[redacted] advised that he knows VON NEUMANN by reputation only. He stated that VON NEUMANN is well regarded in the profession and has the reputation of being one of the most brilliant minds in the scientific field of mathematical physicists. [redacted] he has never received any derogatory information concerning VON NEUMANN's loyalty, character or associates.

CREDIT AND CRIMINAL

b7D

The files of [redacted] did not contain any record or unfavorable information concerning VON NEUMANN or his wife, CLARA.

AT LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA

The files of [redacted] contained no record of VON NEUMANN or his wife, CLARA.

- R U C -

b7c

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUREAU**

REPORT MADE AT <b>KNOXVILLE</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/8/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/6/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>[REDACTED]</b> <b>b7c</b>
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS: <b>[REDACTED]</b>			
<b>- R U C -</b>			
REFERENCE: <b>Bureau teletype to Knoxville dated 10/4/54.</b>			
DETAILS: <b>AT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE:</b>			
<b>[REDACTED]</b>			
<b>- R U C -</b>			
APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE <i>[Signature]</i>	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES	
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		<b>[REDACTED]</b> <b>b7c</b>	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 11 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____

b7c

WA 9 FROM NEWARK

11

7-56 P

DIRECTOR FBI

...URGENT...

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL DATED OCTOBER FOUR, FIFTYFOUR.

NEUMANN PRESENTLY EMPLOYED AT INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY,

PRINCETON, N.J. THE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATES OF VON NEUMANN REGARD

HIM AS A LOYAL AMERICAN AND RECOMMEND HIM FOR A POSITION OF

TRUST.,

[REDACTED]

THESE ASSOCIATES ADVISED THAT DUE TO THE FACT THAT VON NEUMANN

AND DR. J. ROBERT OPPENHIEMER, WERE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE

FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, N.J., THAT THERE WAS A CLOSE

ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO ON AN INTELLECTUAL BASIS. NEIGHBORS

OF VON NEUMANN ADVISE HE AND HIS FAMILY HAVE EXCELLENT REPUTATIONS

AND ARE REGARDED AS LOYAL AMERICANS OF GOOD CHARACTER AND

ASSOCIATIONS. RECORDS OF

[REDACTED] WHICH

CONTAINS NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION. THE RECORDS OF

[REDACTED] REFLECT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TO THAT PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.

REPORT FOLLOWS.

END

W. J. HOSTETTER

ACK PLS

WA NK R 9 WA SP

77-64804-11  
NOT RECORDED  
7 OCT 13 1954

b7c

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tamm	_____
Mr. Sizoo	_____
Mr. Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Holloman	_____

*mb*

*K*

AIR TEL

FBI WASH FIELD

10/11/54

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

JOHN VON NEUMANN, SPI. REBUTEL 10/4/54, AND NY TEL 10/7/54. REP  
 WILL BE DELAYED DUE TO VOLUME OF MATERIAL TO BE REPORTED FROM REVIEW  
 AEC HEARINGS IN MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER AS MENTIONED IN REF  
 NY TEL. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO SUREP BY 10/13.

*47*

LAUGHLIN

*ALL  
b7c*

116-875

AIR TEL

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
 FBI  
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# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUREAU**

REPORT MADE AT <b>NEWARK</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/13/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/7,8/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>[REDACTED]</b> <span style="float: right;">b7c</span>
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN</b>			CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY WHITE HOUSE</b>

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

VON NEUMANN presently employed at Institute For Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, where he is a close associate of Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, Director, as a fellow scientist. Associates regard VON NEUMANN as a loyal American and recommend for position of trust. Neighborhood favorable. No additional information at the [REDACTED] VON NEUMANN's record at [REDACTED] satisfactory. b7D

- RUC -

REFERENCE: Bureau Teletype to Newark, 10/4/54

**DETAILS:**

EMPLOYMENT

Institution For Advanced Study  
Princeton, New Jersey

[REDACTED] Institute For Advanced Study, advised he first became well acquainted with VON NEUMANN at the Ballistics Laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds during the period of [REDACTED] was stationed [REDACTED]

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NK 116-119

there and VON NEUMANN was a consultant at the laboratory. He stated he has been closely associated with VON NEUMANN at the Institute since [REDACTED] as both he and VON NEUMANN are in the field of mathematics. He stated that his association from [REDACTED] to the present with VON NEUMANN has been on a social as well as scholastic basis. He advised he has had numerous opportunities to discuss various topics, political and otherwise, with VON NEUMANN and is of the opinion that VON NEUMANN is a one hundred percent loyal American. He regards VON NEUMANN as one of the few really great mathematicians alive today and that there was absolutely no question in his mind as to the character, loyalty, or associations of VON NEUMANN. He stated VON NEUMANN is the type of individual who would place the good of the United States above everything else and that he would not hesitate in any way in recommending VON NEUMANN for a position of trust.

ALL  
b7C  
b7D

[REDACTED] advised VON NEUMANN's association with Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER was based on the fact they are fellow scientists attached to the Institute For Advanced Study where they had close daily contact.

[REDACTED] Princeton University, advised he has had a close association with VON NEUMANN since approximately [REDACTED] and that he knows him on a social basis as well as scholastically. He stated he regards VON NEUMANN as one of the great men in the country and stated it would be difficult to find anyone who could compare in character and loyalty. He advised he is also acquainted with VON NEUMANN's wife and regards her as a loyal American. He stated he had no doubts and has never heard of anything which would cause him to doubt the loyalty, character or associates of VON NEUMANN and that he would not hesitate in recommending VON NEUMANN for any position of trust.

[REDACTED] stated that as the Institute For Advanced Study, of which VON NEUMANN is a member, is a small group of eminent professors and Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER is the Director of this group, there is a close association between VON NEUMANN AND OPPENHEIMER.

[REDACTED] Princeton University, advised he has known VON NEUMANN ever since [REDACTED] at Princeton University. In 1931 VON NEUMANN and Dr. EUGENE P. WIGNER were appointed to the Jones Professorship in mathematics and physics which was a joint professorship between the University of Berlin and Princeton University. During the course of this professorship VON NEUMANN alternated between the University of Berlin and Princeton University on a half year basis. This lasted until 1933 when HITLER took over Germany, when both VON NEUMANN and Wegner came back to Princeton. He stated VON NEUMANN has been at Princeton University ever since that time. He advised VON NEUMANN was appointed to a professorship in the School of Mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Study in 1933 or 1934 and is still there in that capacity.

ALL  
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b7D

[REDACTED] in connection with the theory of games of which VON NEUMANN is the foremost authority in the country. As a result of which he had frequent occasions for discussions with VON NEUMANN. He regards VON NEUMANN as the best mathematical brain in the world and as a friend and colleague, he has always found him to be an entirely reliable and trustworthy person. He stated that there is no question in his mind regarding VON NEUMANN's character, loyalty or associations, and he stated he would recommend him for a position of trust.

[REDACTED] advised VON NEUMANN has been associated with Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER for a number of years as they are fellow scientists, members of the Institute for Advanced Study, and also as OPPENHEIMER had been director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and VON NEUMANN was a consultant to this project.

[REDACTED] Princeton University, advised he has known VON NEUMANN since VON NEUMANN was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He advised that although he is [REDACTED] and VON NEUMANN is a mathematician, they have still had a close association, since they came to Princeton. He stated

NK 116-119

VON NEUMANN is thoroughly loyal to the United States and is the type of person who would be an excellent security risk in any position of trust. He stated that during the long period he has known VON NEUMANN, he has never had any reason or indication whatever to doubt his character, loyalty or associations in any way.

[REDACTED] stated that due to the fact VON NEUMANN is a member of the Institute For Advanced Study and Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER is the Director there is a close association between the two on an intellectual basis.

ALL  
b7C  
b7D

Dr. J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER is the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J., and during World War II he was the Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. In December 1953 his security clearance was suspended by the Atomic Energy Commission and following a hearing by the AEC in 1954 this suspension was upheld. This case received nation-wide publicity.

NEIGHBORHOOD

The following individuals were interviewed and furnished substantially the same information:

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

They stated their association with VON NEUMANN was limited to occasional parties in the neighborhood and that they had no close association with him. They advised the VON NEUMANNs were very quiet people in the neighborhood who stayed by themselves most of the time. They had an excellent reputation in the neighborhood and were regarded as loyal Americans of good character and associations.

NK 116-119

CREDIT AND IDENTIFICATION

b7c  
b7D

The records of [REDACTED] reflected VON NEUMANN and contained nothing unfavorable.

[REDACTED] advised his records reflected no additional information other than that previously reported.

- RUC -

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT **BUREAU**

REPORT MADE AT <b>WASHINGTON, D. C.</b>	DATE WHEN MADE <b>10/13/54</b>	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE <b>10/5,8,11/54</b>	REPORT MADE BY <b>[REDACTED]</b>
TITLE <b>JOHN VON NEUMANN</b>		CHARACTER OF CASE <b>SPECIAL INQUIRY</b>	

**SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:**

Applicant appointed Consultant, Office, Secretary of Defense, 7/1/54, and was appointed Consultant, Air Force Special Weapons Project same date. Appointed member General Advisory Committee to Atomic Energy Commission 2/27/52, term expiring 8/1/54. Appointed Consultant, Advisor to AEC, 8/2/54 to extend through 6/30/55. No additional information White House Personnel Office. Credit, Criminal, HCUA, OSI, no record. No additional pertinent information CSC. Applicant's testimony before Personnel Security Board, AEC, in matter of J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, reviewed. No additional pertinent information in files of AEC Security Office, Secretary of Defense Security Office, Air Force Special Weapons Project Security Office.

RUC



REFERENCES: Bureau teletype to Albuquerque dated October 4, 1954.  
New York teletype to Bureau dated October 7, 1954.

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

EMPLOYMENT

SA [REDACTED] reviewed the applicant's 201 file maintained in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel Office, which indicated that the applicant, on July 1, 1954, received an

ALL  
b7c

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excepted appointment as a Consultant. The appointment was for a "when actually employed" basis to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) to serve on the Technical Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy. There was no derogatory or additional pertinent information in this file.

The applicant's security file maintained in the Security Office, Office, Secretary of Defense, upon review revealed no additional pertinent information.

ALL  
b7c

SA [REDACTED] reviewed the applicant's file maintained in the Personnel Office of the Department of the Air Force Special Weapons Project, which indicated that he was appointed a Consultant on July 1, 1954, to serve on a "when actually employed" basis in the Weapon Effects Division of the Air Force Special Weapons Project. There was no derogatory or additional pertinent information in this file.

A review of the applicant's security file maintained in the Security Office, Air Force Special Weapons Project, failed to reveal any additional pertinent information concerning him.

[REDACTED] Records Section, Division of Organization and Personnel, AEC, furnished the applicant's personnel file to SA [REDACTED] which reflected that on February 27, 1952, the former President, HARRY S. TRUMAN, appointed applicant a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission for a term expiring August 1, 1954. On August 2, 1954, the applicant was appointed a Consultant to the AEC to serve as an Advisor to the Commission. This employment was to extend through June 30, 1955. No additional pertinent or derogatory information was found in the above records.

[REDACTED] Personnel Clearance, Washington Area Security Office, Security Division, AEC, furnished the applicant's file to SA [REDACTED] which, upon examination, reflected no additional pertinent information concerning him.

[REDACTED] White House Office, advised SA [REDACTED] that his files reflected no additional information regarding the activities of the applicant during the past year other than that sent to the Bureau in the letter requesting the investigations.

CREDIT AND CRIMINAL

The files of the [redacted] were checked and no record concerning the applicant was found therein.

No record of the applicant was found in the files of the [redacted] Washington, D. C., on the date checked; at all times an indefinite number of unidentified records being out of file and unavailable for review.

The files of the United States Park Police were checked and no record of the applicant was found therein.

MISCELLANEOUS

It was determined from a check of the files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities that no record of the applicant was found therein.

The files of the Civil Service Commission, Investigations Division, were checked and no additional pertinent information concerning the applicant was found therein.

The files of the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force, were checked and no record of the applicant was found therein.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: 10/18/54

FROM :

[Redacted] b7C

Tolson	✓
Boardman	✓
Nichols	✓
Belmont	✓
Harbo	✓
Mohr	✓
Parsons	✓
Rosen	✓
Tamm	✓
Sizoo	✓
Winterrowd	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Holloman	✓
Gandy	✓

SUBJECT: JOHN VON NEUMANN  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

This is to furnish information contained in a summary concerning Von Neumann, concerning whom an investigation was ordered on 10/4/54 at the request of the White House, as Von Neumann is a candidate for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Included in summary - In April, 1954, Von Neumann testified before the Personnel Security Board of the Atomic Energy Commission in the case of J. Robert Oppenheimer, whose atomic energy clearance was suspended as a result of the hearings. In testimony, Von Neumann said his association with Oppenheimer was based on mutual employment at Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. Associates advised that appointee and Oppenheimer were associated on an intellectual basis.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Referred

Forty-nine individuals who are business associates, social acquaintances, neighbors, and others highly recommended the appointee as to his character, reputation, loyalty, associates, general standing and ability.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

77-64804-16

(1) That the attached summary be furnished to the Honorable Sherman Adams at the White House and the Attorney General. [Redacted] b7C

(2) That inasmuch as the appointee is or has been employed as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; G-2, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; and the Atomic Energy Commission, that the attached summary also be furnished to these agencies.

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Attachment  
77-64804

[Redacted] 10-18 [Redacted] [Redacted]

1318

October 18, 1954

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN VON NEUMANN  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY SP/HAG/gtt

Pursuant to the request of Mr. Stephen Benedict at the White House dated September 30, 1954, an investigation has been conducted by this Bureau concerning John Von Neumann, the results of which are reflected in the attached summary. A copy of the summary has been furnished to the Honorable Sherman Adams at the White House.

The investigation covered inquiries as to the appointee's character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiry was made as to the sources of his income.

In addition to the White House, dissemination has been made in this matter to the Honorable Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, inasmuch as the appointee has a "Q" clearance with the Atomic Energy Commission and is a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Dissemination has also been made to the appropriate officials of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and G-2, United States Department of the Army, inasmuch as the appointee is or has been a consultant to the various branches of the Armed Forces. The Department of Defense has been furnished a copy of the summary as the appointee is a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Technical Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy.

Att [redacted]

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- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
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- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

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1 Copy of Summary  
sent to White House  
10/12/71 re Marina Whitman  
daughter of John Von Neumann

October 18, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN VON NEUMANN

The information contained in this summary was developed during the course of applicant-type investigations conducted in 1947 and 1953 by this Bureau concerning the appointee as well as information developed during the course of the current investigation.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY SP1/AG/ajt

I. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Birth

Employment and other records reflect that John Von Neumann was born December 28, 1903, at Budapest, Hungary, the son of Margaret Von Neumann and Max Von Neumann.

Naturalization

The appointee immigrated to the United States on January 28, 1930. He was naturalized in the United States District Court at Trenton, New Jersey, on January 8, 1937.

Education

From 1909 to 1921, the appointee attended elementary and high school in Budapest, Hungary.

He attended the University of Berlin at Berlin, Germany, from 1921 to 1923.

From 1923 to 1925, he attended the Federal Institute of Polytechnics at Zurich, Switzerland. He was awarded an Engineer of Chemistry degree from the institute.

During 1925 and 1926, the appointee attended the University of Budapest at Budapest, Hungary. He received a Ph.D. degree from the university in 1926.

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In 1947 Von Neumann was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Science by Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

Employment

Prior to the appointee's entry into the United States in 1930 he had been an instructor at the University of Berlin and the University of Zurich.

b7D [REDACTED]

In addition to the above-mentioned employment the appointee has been employed as follows:

On August 18, 1942, he was appointed a consultant to the Ballistics Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland. From that date to the present time the appointee has been employed as a consultant by the laboratories on a "per diem basis when actually employed." The appointee's contract expires June 30, 1955. His personnel file contains no unfavorable information concerning him.

On July 1, 1947, he was appointed a consultant in the Mathematics Division, Research Department, Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Maryland. He remained so employed until July 1, 1950, at which time he was appointed a consultant in the Aeroballistics Research Department of the laboratory. He has received yearly reappointments to the present time. He is paid on a "per diem basis when actually employed." His personnel file contains no unfavorable information concerning him.


b7D [REDACTED]


The appointee has served as an "expert consultant" to the Bureau of Ordnance, War Department, Aberdeen, Maryland, on a per diem basis from September 2, 1940, to April, 1947.

On February 13, 1950, he received an excepted appointment as a consultant to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. He received yearly reappointments as a consultant, the last appointment being given on July 1, 1954. The appointee's personnel and security file contain no unfavorable information concerning him.


The records of the office of the Secretary of Defense reflect that the appointee received an excepted appointment as an expert consultant on February 28, 1949, to the Research and Development Board of the Committee on Atomic Energy, Washington, D. C. He received yearly reappointments, the last appointment being given on July 1, 1954. This employment is on a "per diem basis when actually employed." The appointee's file contains no unfavorable information concerning him.

On February 27, 1952, Von Neumann received a Presidential appointment as a member of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. On August 2, 1954, he received an appointment as a consultant to the Atomic Energy Commission. This contract is due to expire June 30, 1955. His personnel file contains no unfavorable information concerning him.

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From September 7, 1942, to August 31, 1945, he was employed on an intermittent basis as a consultant by the Bureau of Ordnance, Department of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

From February 26, 1941, to September 4, 1942, and from April 1, 1944, to May 17, 1946, he served as an expert consultant on explosives on a part-time voluntary basis, without compensation, to the National Defense Research Committee, Washington, D. C.  


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A number of persons interviewed concerning the appointee's employment advised that he is a capable individual who possesses a high degree of integrity and ability.

Marital Status

The appointee married Mariette Kovesi on June 1, 1930, at Budapest, Hungary. In divorce proceedings at Reno, Nevada, in October, 1937, the appointee's wife charged the appointee with cruelty. She was awarded a divorce on November 3, 1937.

A number of persons interviewed during this investigation advised that the divorce resulted from a lack of mutual interests and that there was no scandal attached to the divorce.

One child, Marina Von Neumann, born March 6, 1935, at New York, New York, resides with the appointee's former wife at Setauket, New York. The appointee's former wife is remarried.

The records of the United States District Court at Trenton, New Jersey, reflect that Mariette Kovesi Von Neumann became a United States citizen on September 10, 1937.

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The appointee married Klara Dan in Budapest, Hungary, on November 15, 1938. She entered the United States on December 15, 1938. The records of the United States District Court at Trenton, New Jersey, reflect that she became a United States citizen on December 26, 1942. The appointee and his wife reside at 26 Westcott Road, Princeton, New Jersey.

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[REDACTED]

II. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Interviews

During the course of this and previously mentioned applicant-type investigations, a number of persons interviewed, includes business associates, social acquaintances, neighbors and others and they commented favorably as to the appointee's character, loyalty, reputation, general standing and ability. They highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

Persons who commented as above are:

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[REDACTED] Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California.

[REDACTED] Radiation Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, California.

[REDACTED] General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.

[REDACTED] Electronic Computer Project, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED]  
Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge,  
Tennessee.

[REDACTED] Oak Ridge National  
Laboratories, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

[REDACTED] Oak  
Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge,  
Tennessee.

[REDACTED]  
Theoretical Physics Division, University of  
California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

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[REDACTED]  
Physics Division, University of California,  
Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] Theoretical  
Physics Division, University of California,  
Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] University of  
California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] University  
of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] University  
of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] The Lodge, Los  
Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] The Lodge,  
Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] University  
of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED]  
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department,  
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics  
Department, Princeton University, Princeton,  
New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Radiation Laboratory,  
University of California, Berkeley, California.

[REDACTED] Radiation  
Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley,  
California.

[REDACTED] Ballistics  
Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground,  
Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] to the  
director, Ballistics Section, Aberdeen Proving  
Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] Ballistics  
Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground,  
Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] Ballistics Research  
Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen,  
Maryland.

[REDACTED] Ballistics Research  
Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen,  
Maryland.

[REDACTED] Internal Ballistics Division,  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] Institute for Advanced Study,  
Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department,  
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Princeton  
University, Princeton, New Jersey.

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[REDACTED] Mathematics  
Department, Princeton University, Princeton,  
New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Institute  
for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED]  
Palmer Laboratories, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Physics Department,  
Palmer Laboratories, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED]  
Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Princeton,  
New Jersey.

[REDACTED]  
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Civil Engineering Department,  
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department,  
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Mathematics Department,  
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

[REDACTED] Los Alamos Project,  
University of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

[REDACTED] Massachusetts  
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

[REDACTED] Ballistics  
Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground,  
Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] Ballistics Research  
Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen,  
Maryland.

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[REDACTED] Chemical Center,  
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland.

[REDACTED] Los Alamos  
Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

As an example of the comments offered, the following interviews are being set forth:

[REDACTED] advised that he considers the appointee to be "100 per cent American" and that he has never had any reason to question his loyalty. He recommended the appointee highly for a confidential position. He advised further that he has never heard any unfavorable information concerning the appointee.

[REDACTED] advised that he has known the appointee since [REDACTED]. He stated that he knew the appointee [REDACTED] and that he worked with the appointee in Los Alamos, New Mexico, in 1943. He related that Von Neumann is a genius of a scientist and has made great contributions to science. He said the appointee is acutely aware of the great danger of the Russian plans for world domination and he proclaimed that the appointee is definitely "anti-Russian." He described the appointee as a person of good character whose associates are reputable individuals. He stated that the appointee is loyal to the United States in all respects and is a person who can keep a secret and be discreet in his conversations relative to security matters. He highly recommended the appointee for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

[REDACTED] advised that they have known the appointee and his wife since about [REDACTED]. Both stated that the appointee and his wife are loyal to the United States and are more pronounced in their statements indicating such loyalty than the average citizen,

in view of their being naturalized citizens of the United States. Both commented favorably as to the character, reputation and loyalty of the appointee's immediate family. They further advised that the appointee has reputable associates and is very security conscious in regard to confidential information. Both highly recommended the appointee for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

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[REDACTED]

all advised that the appointee is of excellent character and reputation and is a loyal American. All stated that the appointee has reputable associates and they highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

Organizations

Investigation has determined that the appointee is or has been elected or appointed to various positions in the following organizations:

Nassau Club, Princeton, New Jersey; Cosmos Club, Washington, D. C; American Mathematical Society, Providence, Rhode Island; Econometric Society, Washington, D. C; National Academy of Sciences; American Philosophical Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Credit and Criminal

The records of the law enforcement agencies and credit bureaus covering the places of residence of the appointee in the United States were checked and no pertinent identifiable information concerning the appointee was obtained except as follows:

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The records of [REDACTED]

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The records of [REDACTED]

Agency Checks

During the course of this investigation the records of the following governmental agencies were checked and no further pertinent identifiable information concerning the appointee was obtained:

House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Office of Naval Intelligence.

*Referred*

[REDACTED]  
Passport Office, United States Department of State.

Security Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Office of Security, Atomic Energy Commission.

Office of Special Investigations, United States Department of the Air Force.

Central files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The records of the Investigations Division, United States Civil Service Commission, reflect that a record check and inquiry was made concerning the appointee under Executive Order 9835, on October 31, 1949. No question of loyalty or unsuitability was disclosed and the investigation reflected no additional pertinent or unfavorable information concerning the appointee.

Relatives

Investigation has determined that the appointee's father died in July, 1929. A number of persons interviewed

during this and the previously mentioned applicant-type investigations commented favorably as to the character, reputation and loyalty of the following relatives of the appointee:

Mother, Margaret Von Neumann, Brooklyn,  
New York.


Brothers, Michael Von Neumann, Brooklyn,  
New York.

Nicholas Von Neumann, Washington,  
D. C.

The records of the law enforcement agencies and credit bureaus covering the places of residence in the United States of the above-mentioned relatives of the appointee including his wife were checked and no unfavorable information concerning them was obtained.

Investigation has determined that the appointee's mother was naturalized on July 2, 1946, in the United States District Court at Brooklyn, New York. The appointee's brother, Michael, was naturalized on December 6, 1949, in the United States District Court at Brooklyn, New York.

Miscellaneous



Referred

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] advised that he has known the appointee since [REDACTED]. He stated that the appointee and his wife are persons of unimpeachable character and that he has never had any reason to question their loyalty to the United States. He advised that they are both very intelligent individuals and he has never heard them express more than a normal interest in political ideology or political questions. He stated he has known the appointee to be affiliated only with professional organizations and furthermore has only known him to associate with responsible and loyal individuals.

[REDACTED] Von Neumann is the actual originator of much classified data and confidential information relative to experimental weapons and to the best of his knowledge the appointee has always been very careful in the handling and protection of such classified information. He pointed out that Von Neumann and he were involved in an incident at Los Alamos, New Mexico, in August, 1953, which might be considered a procedural security violation but stated that he does not consider that the appointee was actually responsible for this matter in any way. In describing the incident, he stated that [REDACTED] Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] arrived at Los Alamos on a Sunday during August, 1953, upon very short notice. These individuals desired to obtain the opinions of Von Neumann and [REDACTED] relative to a matter in which [REDACTED] was vitally concerned at that time. They explained, however, [REDACTED] could only spend a few hours at Los Alamos and that it had not been possible to furnish the security officials of the Atomic Energy Commission at Los Alamos sufficient data for them to furnish the appropriate clearances and passes for admission to the restricted areas at Los Alamos.

[REDACTED] advised that there was no question in the mind of either the appointee or himself that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were actually cleared for any information in connection with the Atomic Energy program. He said that the appointee did voice an objection to discussing any such information on Sunday at The Lodge, inasmuch as The Lodge was outside of the guarded or restricted areas where all confidential or classified work is performed. He advised, however, that he and the appointee eventually acquiesced and did enter into a discussion of such a matter because of [REDACTED] insistence [REDACTED] could not remain at Los Alamos until the following Monday.

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He informed that the discussion was commenced over the direct objection of Von Neumann who appeared fully cognizant that such a discussion should not have been commenced outside of the appropriately guarded or restricted area. He explained that neither he nor the appointee discussed their work or anything that was being done at Los Alamos and that actually in his opinion the data which were discussed were not of a highly classified nature. He expressed the opinion that he is quite certain that the appointee has never made a practice of discussing classified information in public places and that Von Neumann is very discreet and careful in his conversations. He concluded that the appointee can be completely trusted with confidential information and he highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

A number of individuals who were employed with the appointee at the University of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico, advised that the appointee is a capable and competent individual who possesses a high degree of integrity and ability. They said he is discreet in the handling of confidential and classified information and they highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the Government. All further stated that the appointee is very security conscious and they consider him to be entirely trustworthy.

b7D [REDACTED]

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
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] New Mexico, advised that he has worked rather closely with the appointee in his position as a consultant since about 1946 or 1947. He expressed the opinion that the appointee and his wife are individuals of excellent character and reputation who are loyal to the United States. He said the appointee has never entertained any sympathy for any foreign Government or type of Government. He added that Von Neumann and his wife have at various times appeared to be quite disturbed about the threat of Communism or Communist domination in both Europe and the United States. He related that they have always appeared to be completely opposed to any such political philosophies.

[REDACTED] he is cognizant of the fact that Israel Halperin, a reputed Soviet espionage agent, was at one time a student of the appointee but stated that Von Neumann has never indicated to him that he had any particular close association with Halperin. He stated that he never had any indication that their association exceeded a normal professor-student relationship. He concluded by stating that he considers the appointee to be thoroughly trustworthy in regard to confidential information and he said he would give him his highest recommendation for any position of trust and confidence with the Government.


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A number of other persons interviewed during this investigation furnished substantially the same information as [redacted] and they highly recommended the appointee for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.




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The "New York Post," a daily newspaper, on June 16, 1954, carried an article headed "Oppenheimer Appeal Denies Stand Caused Delay In Building H-Bomb." This article indicated that Dr. John Von Neumann, a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, and a member of the Atomic Energy Commission's General Advisory Commission, testified at the hearing conducted concerning Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer by the Atomic Energy Commission Board, which hearing resulted in Oppenheimer's suspension as a security risk. The article stated that in connection with Oppenheimer's failure to report an individual who attempted to secure from him atomic information for the Russians in 1943, Von Neumann testified, "You have to view the performance and the character of a man as a whole. This episode would make me think that in 1942 and 1943 he was not emotionally and intellectually prepared to handle this kind of job; that he subsequently learned how to handle it and handled it very well, I know."



Referred

Referred



In connection with the hearing held by the Personnel Security Board of the Atomic Energy Commission, J. Robert Oppenheimer's clearance was suspended in December, 1953, pending the outcome of this hearing. The hearings were held from April 12, 1954, to May 10, 1954. On May 27, 1954, the Board recommended in a two-to-one advisory opinion that Oppenheimer's clearance not be reinstated. On June 29, 1954, the atomic energy commissioners by a vote of four to one confirmed the action of the Personnel Security Board and denied atomic energy clearance to Oppenheimer.

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whose favorable comments are noted on page of this summary, advised that the appointee is one of the few really great mathematicians alive today and there is no question in their mind as to the character, loyalty, or associations of the appointee. They stated that Von Neumann would place the good of the United States above everything else. They advised that the appointee's association with J. Robert Oppenheimer was based on the fact that they are

fellow scientists attached to the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, New Jersey. They advised that Oppenheimer is the director of the Institute for Advanced Study and during World War II, he was director of the Los Alamos, New Mexico, Laboratory. They stated that there is a close association between the appointee and Oppenheimer on an intellectual basis. They advised that the appointee is a "one hundred per cent loyal American" and they highly recommended him for a position of trust and confidence with the Government.

Confidential informants of known reliability who are acquainted with various phases of Communist Party activity in the areas where the appointee has resided in the United States advised that they are not acquainted with the appointee and are not aware of any activities on his part.

October 18, 1954

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY COURIER SERVICE**

Honorable Sherman Adams  
The Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/87 BY Sp1/AG/gtt

My dear Mr. Adams:

In accordance with the request of Mr. Stephen Benedict dated September 30, 1954, an investigation has been conducted by this Bureau concerning John Von Neumann, the results of which are reflected in the attached summary.

The investigation covered inquiries as to the appointee's character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiry was made as to the sources of his income.

Dissemination in this matter has also been made to the Honorable Lewis Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, inasmuch as the appointee has a clearance with that agency and is presently serving as a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Dissemination has been made in this matter to the Office of the Secretary of Defense inasmuch as Von Neumann is serving as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Technical Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy.

Dissemination has also been made to the appropriate officials at G-2, United States Department of the Army, and Office of Naval Intelligence as the appointee is or has been a consultant to the various branches of the Armed Forces.

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Sincerely yours  
J. Edgar Hoover

BY COURIER SVC.  
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October 18, 1954

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY COURIER SERVICE

The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY SP1/AG/gtl

My dear Mr. Secretary:

By letter dated September 30, 1954, Mr. Stephen Benedict at the White House requested an investigation of John Von Neumann, who is a candidate for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Inasmuch as the appointee is a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Research and Development Board of the Committee on Atomic Energy, a summary reflecting the results of the investigation conducted by this Bureau concerning Von Neumann is attached.

The investigation covered inquiries as to the appointee's character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiry was made as to the sources of his income.

The above is furnished for your information.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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Date: October 18, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
~~BY COURIER SERVICE~~

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

Registered Mail

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JOHN VON NEUMANN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY Sp1/AG/gtl

By letter dated September 30, 1954, Mr. Stephen Benedict at the White House requested an investigation of John Von Neumann, who is a candidate for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Inasmuch as Von Neumann has served as an expert consultant to the Bureau of Ordnance, War Department, Aberdeen, Maryland, a copy of a summary reflecting the results of the investigation conducted by this Bureau concerning Von Neumann is attached. It is noted that reports reflecting the results of an applicant-type investigation conducted by this Bureau in 1947 concerning Von Neumann have already been furnished to you. The information contained in the applicant-type investigation has been incorporated in the attached summary.

The investigation covered inquiries as to the appointee's character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiry was made as to the sources of his income.

The above is furnished for your information.

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Date: October 18, 1954

To: Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JOHN VON NEUMANN

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
~~BY COURT ORDER~~  
Registered Mail

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY SP1/AG/gtk

By letter dated September 30, 1954, Mr. Stephen Benedict at the White House requested an investigation of John Von Neumann, who is a candidate for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Inasmuch as Von Neumann has been a consultant to the Naval Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak, Maryland, a copy of a summary reflecting the results of the investigation concerning Von Neumann is attached.

The investigation covered inquiries as to the appointee's character, loyalty, general standing and ability, but no inquiry was made as to the sources of his income.

The above is furnished for your information.

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October 21, 1954

**PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY COURIER SERVICE**

Honorable Sherman Adams  
The Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY Sp1/AG/gtt

My dear Mr. Adams:

Reference is made to my letter dated October 18, 1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results of an investigation conducted by this Bureau concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that the testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

For your information in this matter, there are attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearings.

Photostats of Von Neumann's testimony have been furnished to all agencies which received copies of the summary as indicated in my letter of October 18, 1954.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

BY COURIER SVC.  
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NOTE: Request received from White House 10/1/54 by letter dated 9/30/54 to investigate Von Neumann as he is a candidate for the AEC. Favorable investigation completed and summary memoranda transmitted to White House and Attorney General 10/18/54. Subsequent to transmission of summary, Washington "Evening Star" 10/19, reflected release of appointee's testimony before Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations.

before which appointee testified in June, 1954. Photostats of Von Neumann's testimony also furnished to AEC, Office of Secretary of Defense, G-2, Department of the Army, and ONI as appointee is a consultant to these agencies.

October 21, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/15/89 BY SP1/AC/alt

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY COURIER SERVICE

The Honorable  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

Limited Classification  
Review Conducted  
See Top Serial  
Form 4-774

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to my letter dated October 18,  
1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results  
of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the request  
of the White House concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington  
"Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that  
Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of  
the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954.  
The article further revealed that the testimony was  
released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it  
indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's  
security program.

For your information in this matter, there are  
attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony  
of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on  
pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearings

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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October 21, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable Lewis Strauss  
Chairman  
Atomic Energy Commission  
19th and Constitution Avenue, Northwest  
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY SP1/AG/ctt

Dear Admiral:

Reference is made to my letter dated October 18, 1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the request of the White House concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that the testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

For your information in this matter, there are attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearing.

Sincerely yours

J. Edgar Hoover

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Date: October 21, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 BY REGISTERED MAIL  
Department of the Army  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JOHN VON NEUMANN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 2/13/89 BY Sp1/AG/atl

Reference is made to my letter dated October 18, 1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the request of the White House concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that the testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

For your information in this matter, there are attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearings.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
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DATE 2/13/89 BY Sp1/AG/atl

Date: October 21, 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy  
The Pentagon  
Washington 25, D. C.

BY REGISTERED MAIL

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: JOHN VON NEUMANN

Reference is made to my letter dated October 18, 1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the request of the White House concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that the testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

For your information in this matter, there are attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearings.

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The Attorney General.

October 21, 1954

Director, FBI PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JOHN VON NEUMANN  
SPECIAL INQUIRY

Reference is made to my memorandum dated October 18, 1954, which transmitted a summary reflecting the results of an investigation conducted by this Bureau at the request of the White House concerning John Von Neumann.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that the testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and it indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

For your information in this matter, there are attached Photostats reflecting the appointee's testimony of June 15, 1954, before the committee as reported on pages 371 through 386 of the transcript of the hearings.

In addition to the White House, Photostats of Von Neumann's testimony have also been furnished to all agencies which received copies of the summary as indicated in my memorandum of October 18, 1954.

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**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS**

**TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1954**

**HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,  
Washington, D. C.**

The subcommittee met at 9:45 a. m., in room 1501, New House Office Building, Hon. R. Walter Riehlman (chairman of subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. I would like to have the record show the members who are present. Mr. Ikard is on his way, and I understand Mr. Lipscomb will be here very soon. Mr. McCormack and Mr. Riehlman are present at the moment, and I understand Mr. Lantaff is on his way over, too.

We are very fortunate to have Dr. John Von Neumann, professor of mathematics at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J.

Doctor, you have been informed, of course, by our staff of our interest in this research and development program. You know that we are trying to develop as many facts and as much information as we possibly can along the lines as to whether or not we are getting out of our research and development program all that we should; and we are anxious to find out from people of your background, and I know you have served on many important committees, any views and information that can help advance this program of research and development.

That is in general terms exactly what this committee is interested in, and I think that we have sent to you, and I think that you have studied, several questions. I would like to ask this question of you at the outset, Doctor, whether or not you feel that this type of a program instituted by this committee is a worthwhile type of program, and whether we are advancing along the proper lines, or whether we are just rehashing something where we will never discover or develop or help this program.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN VON NEUMANN, PROFESSOR OF MATHE-  
MATICS, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, N. J.**

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I feel that the questions you are asking are the decisive ones and of course are questions which have been asked before, and it is very necessary to ask them again and again, and I think the best way to handle these things has not been developed yet, and it will take a long time before it is developed. So I think these are very important questions that should be looked at now.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I appreciate that, and we recognize that we must reevaluate consistently and constantly our programs to try to develop better ones and more advanced ones.

NOTE.—Asterisks denote classified material deleted.

The subcommittee is very happy to have your appraisal in this field. With that statement, would you like to make a statement to the subcommittee, and then we will ask you some questions?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. May I then say a few things which come to my mind?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Yes, sir.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. You will see whether they are in the direction which you consider most relevant, and you will then probably direct the discussion in the direction in which you think it should be directed.

I understand that you are concerned with the management of research and development in the Government.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. That is one phase of it.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. With the methods of developing it.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. That is right.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. The immediate questions are whether it should be handled in military organizations the way it is now, whether it should be handled in more or less separate civilian organizations, whether there should conceivably be a complete civilian organization to handle all research and development for the military.

If not, how much should be handled in house, and how much should be handled by contract. To the extent to which it is handled in military organizations, is there anything in the military organization which is not well suited for this kind of thing, or are the necessary adjustments made or what adjustments should be made?

I assume these are roughly the things you would want comment on.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Yes; we very much appreciate your comments on those issues.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Speaking of these issues, I would like to say that during the war, of course, there was a separate civilian organization which handled research and development. It did not handle everything, because there were military laboratories at the same time which, by the way, to a large extent, were manned by civilians, but still a large part of the research and development during the war was handled by a separate civilian organizations, namely, the OSRD.

It is a question which, of course, everybody has been asking, whether there should be such an organization now, or whether it should be renewed when an emergency arises, or how one should proceed. I would think it would be quite difficult to return to the old method, because the need for a separate civilian organization existed then because the military research and development organization was quite small in 1941, and it had to be expanded very rapidly, and the quickest way to do it, with amateurs, with people from the outside, was in a separate organization.

Now research and development in the military has grown enormously. It has nearly the dimensions of the wartime OSRD. It would be very difficult to graft another civilian organization on top of this. It must be admitted, of course, that if, as, and when there is an emergency, this will create a problem.

In other words, during the emergency of 1941 the fact that the existing organization was small made it easier to improvise and made it easier to make fresh starts. If there is another emergency like this, it will be much more difficult, because there is a large organization already, there are already many people who, by their past background, must be tempted to think that they know all the answers, yet when

there is a real crisis, nobody can know all the answers. This will be a source of complications. In other words, a large establishment is useful and necessary, but it also produces some rigidity. This cannot be helped. To sum it up: It will be quite difficult to set up a separate civilian organization.

So I would go on the premise that there will not be a separate civilian organization, but that things will be handled in the Department of Defense.

I realize that this is not the only possible way. In Great Britain there is a separate organization, a Ministry of Supply, which does research and development for the services, but the whole institutional and organizational background is very different, and I think it would be very difficult to copy it here in America.

Mr. McCORMACK. Will you state briefly what you consider to be the difference between the British and what would be here in a civilian organization?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I don't know the organization very well, so the statements I make are superficial, but I think that a merger of the civil service and the military has taken place to a larger extent there than here. In other words, the military and the civilian organizations are probably more separate in their backgrounds and in their setup here than they are in England.

This is second-hand information on my part, because I don't know the British organization very well, but I know plenty of people who have worked in it. They uniformly said that it would not be easy to transplant. However, as I said, this is not my personal experience.

The thing that I do know first hand, and which impresses me greatly, is that it was much easier to set up the civilian OSRD in 1941 than it would be in the future, as I have said above. It could probably only be done by taking the existing military laboratories away from the military and this would produce even worse problems.

These laboratories are now working with the military and have adjusted to each other and now know each other's problems, and if they were separated, one would have to go through another apprenticeship in that regard. I think it is a very difficult operation, and one should think very carefully on it before one embarks on it. It would be much more difficult than it was in 1941.

Mr. BALWAN. There is another possibility here which might exist. I understand that you are speaking of a civilian organization outside of the military department, but you want it to be understood that there might be a research and development organization within the Department of Defense, but still on civilian lines, in which the military support functions are distinct and separate from the organization itself.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Very much so, and I argued against a complete separation. That is, separation to the degree to which the OSRD was separate, or the degree to which the British Ministry of Supply is separate.

Mr. BALWAN. And we understand that you will speak to the point of the desirability of separating it within the Department of Defense.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Within the Department of Defense, I think there could be more separation than there is today.

Mr. McCORMACK. You mean more autonomy?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, more autonomy. There are all sorts of difficulties in marrying the civilian function of the research and

development with the military and those things deserve very careful study in each case.

One of the major aspects of the problem is in a military laboratory, whose personnel is primarily civilian, that in most cases the administrative head of the laboratory is military. This, in itself, need not be wrong. The military produce many good administrators. (In this connection there is another viewpoint which ought to be brought in about administration, to which I will come in a minute.) However, there is one thing in the normal military organization which fits in very badly, and regarding this something should be done. This is the military rotation system in such positions.

Normally, an officer rotates out of a laboratory in 4 years.

Mr. McCORMACK. How often?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Four years.

Mr. McCORMACK. I thought it was much quicker than that.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think that is true.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. It is 2 years, as a rule.

Mr. BALWAN. And at Cambridge Research Center they had 12 different commanding officers in the past 6 or 8 years.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. The Army Ordnance averages 4 years.

Mr. McCORMACK. We are talking about the Air Force and the Navy.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. This is, of course, very bad. No industrial organization would leave an executive for only 2 years in such a job. The laboratory director, who has to live with his staff and know them very well, of course, develops his main usefulness only after several years. Two years is completely absurd, because anybody in a complicated job spends the first year in finding out what it is, and the last year in preparing to leave.

There are exceptions. I have known laboratories where the same officer remained in charge for a decade, and some of those laboratories were very good ones, and in each case one of the main reasons why it was so good was that the man did stay so long.



It is bad for the professional career of an officer to stay too long on one assignment, and particularly to stay too long in a technical assignment. If an officer stays for 10 years, that is proof that he is interested, and that creates a presumption that he is well suited for that job. Yet, this is definitely the exception. This rotation is bad administratively and it makes things unnecessarily difficult for the civilians who are the laboratory head's lieutenants, and who are running the place.

It is unreasonable to expect an executive to readjust himself every 2 or 3 years to a new boss. It should be changed.

Mr. McCORMACK. In my mind, the uppermost proposition is what policy would be consistent with the national interest of our country? That is paramount. Everyone has to make sacrifices at times in the national interest.

On the question of rotation, without regard to the past, but based on your experience with the past and present, we would like to get your views as to how you think there might be developed that relationship between the military and the scientist that will be conducive to the best interests of our country.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think it will be desirable to develop officers in charge of major installations who should have a long tour of duty there.



MR. LANTAFF. Is it not possible that promising officers in the military faced with a long tour and the problem of getting lost in the military promotion cycle might shy away from research and development if they were on long tours. You would have a considerable pressure on the part of your military brains to stay away from research and development so that they would not get lost, so they could keep up with the promotions of their fellow officers?

DR. VON NEUMANN. This is undoubtedly true; but I think the amount of good that the ablest man can do is important, too. So it would be preferable to get those who are sufficiently attracted to that job.

MR. LANTAFF. Even though that might be an inferior type of officer.

DR. VON NEUMANN. They are not inferior. They are probably better suited for this type of administration. They might be less ambitious, but even this is not necessary. I think it ought to be possible to develop a system in the military, where there are promotion possibilities for those officers, too. After all, the research and development in the military is a pyramid like every other part of every other organization, including the military, and the possibilities of promotion could be considerable. The officer in charge of the entire research and development system is a very high officer. I think the highest officers in this class are lieutenant generals, so this is a perfectly good goal, even for a very ambitious officer.

MR. McCORMACK. You mean the avenue for a reasonable promotion in justifiable cases should be established and be open?

DR. VON NEUMANN. Yes, sir; it should not be bad for the officer's career that he has been sitting in one laboratory for 10 years. It should be realized and it should be established that this is an important branch of the military. This is, of course, realized, but it should be realized that this branch of the military has its own *modus operandi*.

MR. LANTAFF. I think that there are many adjuncts of that policy of extending it which has to be looked into.

DR. VON NEUMANN. I think the area is important enough that it should have criteria of its own, that whether or not an officer has a good record and is fit for promotion should depend on how he performs on the job under the criteria of this area; it means that this is a type of specialization.

MR. McCORMACK. We had evidence from a professional career officer who retired recently that in his opinion in the field of research and development, the best man, the best person, should be recognized, whether they are in the uniform or out of uniform in the field of research and development. That is in the laboratory work and development. What is your view on that?

DR. VON NEUMANN. I am all for it. But one has to look into this question, too: What are the difficulties of bringing people into that area? My first remark was based on granting that the head of a laboratory is military. In this situation I consider it a mistake that there is not a research and development administration career within the military, and that the officers who are doing this are not doing it for a longer period.

MR. McCORMACK. By a commander, the head of the military, you mean a qualified man.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. You do not mean somebody with his rank?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. That is right. It is true in many types of organizations, in industrial organizations, and also in academic organizations, that it is by no means necessary that the head administrator should be the best technical specialist in the field. There are other human properties which are needed for administration. However, the head should be somebody who has an absolute grasp of the field, who understands that it is important, who understands that it has autonomous criteria, and who wants to make it his life work, and not a short tour of duty.

I think the military philosophy of the short tour of duty is that the field commanders should have an appreciation and understanding of the technical things that back them up, and the best way to acquire this is to put as many of them as possible into charge of various laboratories, since this will educate them to understand the technical things which they will need in the field.

This, in itself, is reasonable, but it is an awfully expensive way to achieve this idea by impairing the administration of large laboratories which employ thousands of men and represent tens of millions of dollars in investment. It is a very bad idea to make the administration of absolutely vital units an area for education.

Mr. BALWAN. Couldn't there be an understanding where an officer attached to a research and development center could be there for training purposes or for familiarity with that, rather than for command and line responsibility?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Of course. The head of the laboratory, whether military or civilian, could have a large number of military officers who are moving through the organization. I know one civilian organization, which I think is not in your province, but which really has the same problems, and that is the Atomic Energy Commission. Take the Atomic Energy Commission laboratory in Los Alamos, it is under civilian direction. There are, of course, numbers of military officers there. Also at Sandia Laboratory next door to Los Alamos, which does another part of the job. Some of the officers are there for short tours of duty. They are not running the laboratory. They are there for a short tour of apprenticeship, and depending on their seniority they have more or less important jobs, but they are not policymaking if the laboratory is not their lifework.

Mr. BALWAN. I had another question related to this subject. Speaking of the prestige that can be attached to a research and development officer corps for career purposes, I wonder if you are familiar with the system that the German Army uses in providing research and development ideas for the general staff in Germany?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I am not too familiar with it. It is my impression, however, that during the last war the Germans did not manage their research and development well. I don't know how fair an impression that is, but it is my impression that they did not do their work too well. They did some things brilliantly, but they handled many others poorly.

By and large, the British organization was better and kept house better with the available resources.

Mr. BALWAN. We heard remarks from our own military people which seemed to admire the German system and credit them with

several discoveries which were far ahead of ours in the field of guided missiles, for instance.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. They were very good in guided missiles.

Mr. IKARD. I had the impression that their appraisal was that the German people were research-minded, and that they had an atmosphere of research that was far above ours, rather than the military system being better.

Mr. McCORMACK. That was my impression, too.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I think that was about the statement given by General Phillips, who gave us that information, that the scientists were really farther advanced and were moving faster in those different fields than we were in this country in World War II. The specifically named the guided missile and some other projects that they had pretty well under way in World War II, and on which we had not gotten started.

Mr. BALWAN. Apparently they had a better climate in which these ideas and research and development grow.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. For one thing, I think they failed in one, and that was a large-scale organization. They had some excellent men and some excellent projects. For instance, they developed a long-range guided missile far ahead of everybody else, but managed to get it into action when it was too late.

Mr. BALWAN. That was their production lag.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. So the overall planning of the effort was not good.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. The planning and the production were not properly carried together, apparently.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, they were weak in what is usually called systems analysis. They had one part of the system, but not the other. It is claimed they spent 1 year in getting the V-1 guided missile out of the condition where it "hunted." "Hunting" means that it doesn't fly straight. Apparently they could have launched their V-1's if they had not insisted on making them fly straight. The fact of life is that it is easier to shoot it down if it does fly straight. It would have been a better weapon if it had "hunted." However, the people who developed it were aeronautical engineers and they just would not produce an object which would not fly straight. So there was a lack in having no one to step in and tell that this "improvement" was harmful, and that they could have stopped the development sooner by 1 year and come out with a better weapon.


These higher level coordinations were not adequate. They were usually ahead of everybody else in guided missiles, but on the other hand, they completely mismanaged atomic energy, and they were slightly behind on rockets.

At one decisive point the Russians were ahead of them on rockets, and they probably lost the battle of Stalingrad because they did not realize the importance of rockets.

Mr. McCORMACK. You were talking, before we started asking you questions. Will you come back to that, please?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. These were just remarks on one of the changes about the military management, in laboratories where there is military management.

There is the further question, whether there should be military management in these laboratories. One has to admit one thing in



favor of military management unquestionably, namely, that under the conditions under which the Government operates, it is very difficult to get good industrial executives. There is a very peculiar situation in these large research and development organizations, and quite particularly development plants that people whose job is in every respect the job of an industrial executive gets a salary that is 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 times less than what the men doing precisely the same thing would get in industry.

Thus there is a chronic shortage of executive talent in Government work.

However, there is one class of people who are trained to be administrators, and who are conditioned not to expect industrial salaries, and they are the military officers. Therefore, it is a fact of life that one of the important sources of managerial talent which is available to the Government is in the military, and if one wants to eliminate this, one has to do something about how to get industrial executives into the Government service, which is probably a very difficult thing to adjust to.

Mr. BALWAN. The OSRD, which was outside the military during the war, survived primarily because there was an emergency in which we could draw upon people.

Mr. VON NEUMANN. Yes; this was an absolute emergency. First of all, this was wartime, so everybody considered it completely reasonable that he did not necessarily receive the maximum pay for his particular talent, and furthermore everybody knew that it was for a relatively short time. This cannot be repeated in the long pull.

Mr. BALWAN. To some extent we have the parallel in the Atomic Energy Commission, where we have the Chairman and the general manager, who are military people, managers that we can probably keep in there, because they are the kind of people who are devoting a career to it. Would that be a correct observation?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes. However, the Chairman has a high military rank, but by his background he is a civilian, and a man of independent means. The general manager, on the other hand, is a retired Army officer.

Mr. McCORMACK. Does the man have to be a scientist in another field to occupy a managerial position?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. No, but he has to have a very good scientific education.

Mr. McCORMACK. For instance, to what extent? A very good scientific education in what way? Would you sort of elaborate on that for the record?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Well, he has to have a very good understanding and has to know the subject very well. It is not decisive that he should have made original contributions. It is more important that he should be able to understand human relations very well.

In science itself the criteria are, of course, different. There is a fundamental principle that the one thing that is absolutely important is originality, and it is not so important how good the man's human relations are. There it is a part of the code that you disregard how easy or hard a man is to get along with, and you ask primarily whether he can produce something new.

This is clearly not the primary criterion if you evaluate men from the point of view of their qualification for managing the affairs of

others. Yet, it is necessary there, too, that the man on top, although he will not understand everything in minute detail much better than everybody else under him, at least be not too far behind them.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think that is self-evident, but I simply wanted it for the record, the reasons for your opinion. Do you want to proceed now?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Let me add another thing. All these things are important. In the long run they will be the ones that matter. However, one would be giving a completely distorted picture, from the immediate point of view, if one did not point out that right now there is another problem which is much more urgent. This is the problem of how we handle security. It is very serious and it is growing more and more serious as time goes on. At this moment this is our major problem and I think it would be very important that Congress, and this committee in particular, give it a great deal of attention.

The security problem in its present form is quite new. In less acute ways, of course, it always existed. However, the problem now is much more important than it was a few years ago, and we are now in a very peculiar situation, which always obtains when something becomes important which was not so important before. Then these ad hoc methods with which one could deal with the thing before it became important, prove to be inadequate and one sees all their inherent weaknesses.

We could afford to deal with security in an ad hoc manner as long as security problems and security cases were rare. But now security problems are gigantic, the attention of the public is concentrated on them, and therefore, we must develop a better and more systematic way to deal with them.


Right now we are with security in a legal no-man's-land.

On the one hand whether somebody is acceptable from the point of view of security is merely one of several qualifications for certain sensitive jobs. Now whether a man is qualified for a job is not a legal or judicial matter. It is merely a matter for the potential employer's subjective evaluation. It will therefore, be handled rather informally.

On the other hand, public attention is now focused on this problem, and the public frequently views security proceedings as minor trials for treason. Yet we are still living with a system where this is an administrative matter and handled administratively and not judicially. This is a very bad situation because by now the public puts a judicial interpretation on all the administrative measures that are taken, and the administrative measures, have to be taken by administrators and not by judges, and, therefore without most of the safeguards that would surround a judicial procedure.

We must either convince the public that it is not a matter involving a man's honor and good citizenship whether he is or is not a security risk, in which case one can continue to handle it informally and administratively, or else we have to admit that it is a capital matter in which case one has to develop judicial methods and deal with it.

Practically speaking, I think that it will be hard to convince the people at large that a security matter is not a capital matter. By now everybody believes that this is very important, that this has a lot to do, no matter what we say, with loyalty and good citizenship. Conse-



quently, I think you ought to consider very seriously how to get this from the administrative into the judicial area, presumably by legislation. Of course, this will not be easy.

The legislation will have to be very very careful, and it would be rash and improper for me to make detailed suggestions, but I think we should realize that this by now is a responsibility of the legislature and ought to be recognized by it.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Apparently you feel that this matter of security is having a tremendous effect on our scientists working in these different fields of research and development for the Government?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, it has a very considerable effect. I think that remarks like those that scientists will cease to work for the Government, and so on, are loose and I would not take them quite seriously, but that this disturbs people, that this is a very serious matter, is certainly true.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. In your experience, have you had many people call that to your attention and discuss it with you?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. As you surely know, in the circles in which I move it is very hard to keep away from this business. The problem is not how much you hear about this, but how many opportunities do you get to talk about something else, and I have just thwarted a very good occasion right now.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I am sure there is plenty of talk about it. The thing that we are primarily interested in is just exactly how it is affecting the research and development program and the scientists participating in it.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. It is very disturbing, because very many people are worried about it. Very many people who have some trivial blot way back in their past do not know whether they can take a chance on getting into sensitive work, although the matter may be irrelevant, and they could do very good work in this area.

Mr. McCORMACK. Outside of that on the question of security, suppose the policy of the military is massive retaliation, which means the offensive, and a scientist believes that in addition to a strong offense there should be strong defenses established for the protection of the people in our cities, some people might construe such a person as a security risk because he is a strong advocate of research for defensive purposes as well as offensive purposes.

That goes into thought control, doesn't it?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. It certainly could. There is a grave danger of confusing a technical opinion with a political intention.

Mr. McCORMACK. How serious is that?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. However, much more trivial things than this are dangerous. I mean, it is very dangerous that large numbers of people live in constant fear because some associations they had in the past, some indiscretions they have committed in the past may come back and damage them and nobody who is not absolutely unblemished knows for sure where he stands. Nobody knows what the methods of rehabilitation are, or if they exist. Also, to have once been dropped for security reasons, is for the average person, and especially for small people, a professional catastrophe. It is perfectly true that this applies only for sensitive jobs, but more and more segments of the industries in which anybody is expected to be employed have sensitive jobs. Many large companies find it embarrassing not to be able to

move their people around freely, and so it is a very important professional qualification to be clearable, and to lose your clearance in some industries is about as pleasant as for a doctor to be expelled from the AMA.

It is a very serious thing which affects people's professional reputations and it is a fiction, which was true a long time ago, but it is not true now, that these are confidential matters that are handled in camera. To have these things regulated by law and judicial process is just as important as having a civil service. It ought to be carefully thought out how rigid the rules should be that will cover this area.

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not think that that last expression of yours will find anything but hearty approbation by anyone around this table. But we are here listening to you present your views for our benefit and to enable us to see what we can do to improve it.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think I have touched on the critical area.

Mr. LANTAFF. In connection with the security-risk problem you have mentioned, that it is a legislative matter, what specific recommendations would you have in that field?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I would certainly not undertake to suggest a legislative program. It is very difficult. But I think it ought to be possible to have legislation which defines quite rigidly in civil service and also in working on Government contracts what the criteria of security are, under what conditions past behavior before the enactment of these laws will be evaluated, which set the relationship to the principle of not passing ex post facto laws and of avoiding "double jeopardy." Some agencies make a real effort to make these administrative security boards operate almost like a court. Others do it much more informally. However, in fact, none of them operate entirely like a court.

Mr. IKHARD. In many instances it is not even handled by an administrative body.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. There are, of course, all kinds of pressures bearing on these people, and in cases where everybody would like to keep the matter confidential, it cannot be kept so, because everybody thinks that it will come out anyway and acts accordingly.

By now it is clear that these problems will be with us for a long time. Indeed, unless the Russians reform, or unless there is a war very quickly, these problems will be with us for decades.

Mr. LANTAFF. I take it that you mean that the Executive order under which we now provide for clearances or the finding that somebody is a security risk is not a good Executive order in that connection?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think mainly, that it is by now the third Executive order in this area. In other words, the rules have been changed 3 times, which makes it possible to try people 3 times for the same offense. It is true that it is not an offense, and it is true that it is not a trial, but public opinion views it that way, and no matter what we tell each other, some of the odium of multiple trials for the same offense adheres to it.

Mr. LANTAFF. You make the point that if I am a scientist and I got into the Government at a time when, let us say, Cuba is a part of the free world, and then later on Cuba becomes dominated by the Communists, and I have a large segment of my family in Cuba, that I might find out that under a change in world events I might become a security risk.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. This is not even what I mean. This is, of course, a hardship and something ought to be done about hardships of this type, but they are inherent in what goes on in the world that such hardships will arise. The thing that really worries me is this, that if somebody's name was considered under the second Executive order which dealt with these matters, and he was cleared, he has then a bona fide right to assume he is really cleared, yet there comes along a third Executive order which makes the criteria more rigid. Under those conditions it is not the individual's, but the Government's fault that the second Executive order was too lax. It is the Government's fault that it did not immediately come up with the proper law and not the individual's. What I say here are just normal principles in law.

If one day Congress decides that the laws of murder are too lax, then everybody who has been tried under previous laws will get the benefit of that. It is just a dangerous principle that the Government finds out in successive stages what the law should be, and the individual incurs multiple risks in the process.

I realize that what I say is legally sloppy, because these are not laws, but the merit of the case is still this.

Mr. IKARD. In other words, what you are saying is that if a person is cleared under existing regulations, and then at some subsequent date he should be criticized or in effect have an unfavorable ruling for having worked during the period that he was cleared under a bad order or a bad law?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes; in this case I think it is only fair to say the Government is to be blamed. If the rigid criteria are the proper ones, it is the Government's fault that they were not applied immediately. It is no excuse that it was an earlier, and other, government.




Mr. IKARD. You are stating a very fundamental principle, that we adhere to, or supposedly has been one of our fundamental precepts of government.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think it is a fundamental principle and one observes it in every other area. Security offenses are not more dangerous than espionage, and not more reprehensible than murder. Hence, they need not be treated without the safeguards with which the latter are treated.

I do not say this in any contentious spirit. I merely say it is high time to go and do something, and that Congress should do something about this.

Mr. LANTAFF. How do you handle it when you have a change in world events which would change your concept of a security risk like the situation I mentioned in Cuba? Do you think that if a person is cleared this year, and 20 years from now that country is under foreign domination, that they should forever be cleared regardless of their sympathy?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. That, I would say, is an accident for which the individual is not responsible. The Government, of course, should protect its interest and in that case the Government should find a formula to move the man into an unsensitive position without suspending his clearance. Such things can happen in any organization, that a man, who through no fault of his own one day ceases to satisfy certain criteria, so that the organization cannot continue him in a job for which he is not suited. Then one has to find some tactful



form for reassigning him but without offense or damage to his reputation.

Mr. McCORMACK. Don't you think that as important as that is, that that is something that is bound to resolve itself in a satisfactory way? We are going through a sort of a wave, a burden, and everybody is under strain. There is a lot of fear around in the world, and don't you think that that is something which the logic is bound to satisfactorily solve?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think that the strain in the world may go on a good long time. The strain under which we live politically may easily continue for a generation.

Mr. McCORMACK. That is dependent on the other side, what their actions are.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. But it has been going on for 10 years, and 10 years is a long time; and if it has been going on for 10 years, it might easily go on another 10 years.

I have a lot of confidence that the problem will have to be solved, but I think it will have to be solved by legislation. I do not bank on the problem of security disappearing, because it is completely outside our control, it exists for reasons about which we can do absolutely nothing. It may not disappear.

Mr. McCORMACK. Legislating in a period of emotionalism is liable to bring about greater abuses than legislating under more normal conditions. I know that through experience.

The thought in my mind was along the lines that Mr. Lantaff indicated, that probably the immediate solution would be by Executive order. When you use the word "legislation," you are using it in terms of governmental action, are you not, in the broader sense?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. It could be any kind of governmental action, provided that it did establish the judicial character of these proceedings.

Mr. McCORMACK. During the war there existed a pretty effective working partnership between the military and the scientists. You have testified to that already.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. And there was between the professional men and the scientists, there was an effective working relationship, or we might term it partnership for descriptive purposes.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes; I think it worked very well.

Mr. McCORMACK. Any kind of a relationship between human beings requires mutual respect and an understanding mind to get the maximum results. That is axiomatic, anyway, isn't it?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. Do you think the relationship between the military and science, and I will confine it to the scientist, is as good now as it was during the war?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes; I think it is intrinsically as good.

Mr. McCORMACK. You say intrinsically. Is it as good?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Oh, yes. If anything, it is better. In other words, the two groups are more used to each other. I would think that the things which mainly require looking at are organizational matters and not so much the attitudes of individuals.

Mr. McCORMACK. Will you elaborate on what would come under the purview of organizational matters as you just used that phrase?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Well, for instance, the thing I mentioned earlier, that an officer in charge of a laboratory should not be rotated out of that job very soon. This is typically something which has nothing to do with the attitude of the individual. There is nothing wrong about the attitude of an officer who doesn't want to do something which harms him professionally, and right now staying on in one place harms him professionally.

There are a few other things, and there are laboratories which are on military posts where the social coexistence of the military and the civilians require some adjustment. I am sure you know about these matters.

Mr. McCORMACK. Dr. Vannevar Bush is a pretty good authority; would you say?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. McCORMACK. Have you read his article in last Sunday's New York Times?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, I saw it.

Mr. McCORMACK. Did you notice in there that he went to the extent of saying that the relationship has been gravely damaged and is in danger of being gradually destroyed? Did you see that?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, I saw that.

Mr. McCORMACK. What are your views on that?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I wouldn't say it is being destroyed. It is certainly being damaged. There is no doubt about it.

Mr. McCORMACK. His language was that it is being gravely damaged.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I wouldn't say its relationship to the military, but its relationship to the Government.

Mr. McCORMACK. He went pretty thoroughly into it, and he covered respective views pretty thoroughly. He said:

During the war there was produced an effective working partnership between scientists and military men, in fact, more broadly between professional men and officers of Government. It grew slowly, and it encountered many obstacles, but the time came when civilian scientists and engineers were working in harmony with military men under conditions of mutual respect, contributing their joint efforts effectively to a common cause. This was an exceedingly important and valuable partnership, for it is the nature of modern war that neither military men nor scientists alone can grasp the trends in the art and its probable evolution; it can be grasped in concert but only if there is an atmosphere of understanding and mutual regard.

This partnership, so essential to our future safety, has been gravely damaged and is being gradually destroyed. This is indeed a matter which warrants the earnest thought of us all. In one way or another, the trend must be reversed, for we face an adroit and skillful enemy who has shown that he can apply science effectively to means of waging war.

Now, coming from Dr. Vannevar Bush, I consider that to be quite significant. Have you any views to express on that subject?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I wouldn't be quite so pessimistic. In other words, I wouldn't use the words that it is being gradually destroyed. I would certainly say that it is now being damaged and endangered.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes; that is the point he stressed and the gradually destroyed was to emphasize the fact that it has been damaged to a grave extent.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. There was one more thing I wanted to mention, but I forgot to bring it up earlier. I think a modus operandi is set up for running laboratories by contract. This was done by the Govern-

ment and was very successful in several cases. It is, without explicitly stating it, a principle that I think everybody believes in, that if anything exceptionally difficult has to be done, it is most frequently done by an ad hoc contract.

Consider what happened when the Korean war started and simultaneously with this, although it was not particularly related to it, the inadequacies of our air defense were realized. Immediately we set up a contract at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. One of the very best laboratories of the Government, Los Alamos, is run by contract. Another good example is the Rand Corp.

Mr. LANTAFF. Have you ever evaluated your thought there to determine whether or not there have been greater scientific achievements that have been made through letting a contractor or a private institution carry out the work rather than have it done by a Government-operated laboratory?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. You mean in research and development?

Mr. LANTAFF. Yes.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I think by and large the contracts have been more successful.

Mr. LANTAFF. Is there any way that we could get a comparison of that?

Dr. VON NEUMANN. My impression, for instance, is that in the field of operations research where a number of directly owned Government operations have worked and where the Rand Corp. has worked also, that Rand has by and large been a stronger organization and has handled more difficult problems, and has done better than what the Air Force could have done directly in a laboratory of their own. It is a very successful operation.

I think that, as a technical Government laboratory goes, the Los Alamos Laboratory is something quite exceptional and outstanding. It is a contract.

I repeat: You will probably find that each time when something really difficult came up, the people in the Government who had to make the decisions instinctively started to look for a contractor. \* \* \*

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I know the doctor has to be out of here by 11 o'clock because he must catch a train. Time will be very limited.

Do you have other questions, Mr. Ikard?

Mr. IKARD. No.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. Lantaff, do you have any further questions?

Mr. LANTAFF. No.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Mr. McCormack?

Mr. McCORMACK. No further questions.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I think in supplementing what you have had to say here today, we would like to give you an opportunity to read the record as it has been made, making any corrections that you would like to.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I would very much appreciate it. I surely have forgotten some things. I would also like to make some stylistic revisions.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. That would be very helpful and there might be some additional remarks that you would like to add to those that you have already made. That would be very helpful to the committee on this project.

As you are revising your remarks, I would like to have you keep in mind that this is an executive session, which you understand, and if the committee should make up its mind at some future time to make the hearings public, we want you to have that in mind when you are revising your remarks. I wouldn't want you to strike anything, but if there is anything that you would care to have deleted from the printed record, you could make a notation of it.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes, unless otherwise marked, this may be included in your publication. If any part of it is not so, I will make such notation.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Very good, and we would not want you to hesitate to give us additional information that you would think would be helpful that you would want to mark "secret," and not to be put in as a public record.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I know that you are on some important committees at the present time, and I wonder if you could tell the members of the committee the organizations on which you are serving at the present time.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. With respect to this matter?

Mr. RIEHLMAN. Your activities regarding research and development.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. I am not now, and I have never been full time in the Government service, although during the war I spent practically all of my time in bits and pieces of various Government jobs, but I have essentially been a consultant. What I have been telling you here is not entirely "from the inside", it is perhaps half "in" and half "out." I probably spend now 20 percent of my time on Government work as a consultant.

I am a member of the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission.

I am a consultant of the Los Alamos Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission, and recently also of the Livermore Laboratory.

\* \* \* \* \*

I am a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Air Force, and the chairman of one of the panels of this board. \* \* \*

I am also a member of the Scientific Advisory Committee of the Ballistic Research Laboratories of the Army Ordnance in Aberdeen.

I am also a member of Mr. Quarles' Technical Advisory Panel of Atomic Energy.

\* \* \* \* \*

These are the essential ones.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. I think we will have to excuse the doctor, and we deeply appreciate your coming down here and giving us this information.

Dr. VON NEUMANN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. RIEHLMAN. The committee will stand in recess at this time, and will reconvene at 2 o'clock this afternoon in the same room.

(Thereupon, at 11 a. m., the committee took a recess until 2 p. m., the same day.)

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Rosen *RRM*

DATE: 10/25/54

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Sizoo
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

FROM : Mr. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: JOHN VON NEUMANN

The Director requested to be advised whether we conducted an investigation concerning Von Neumann.

Request received from the White House 10/1/54 by letter dated 9/30/54 to investigate Von Neumann as he was a candidate for the Atomic Energy Commission.

Summary transmitted 10/18/54 to the White House and the Attorney General and copies of the summary furnished to the Office of the Secretary of Defense; G-2, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; and the Atomic Energy Commission as the appointee was a consultant to these agencies.

The October 19, 1954, issue of the Washington "Evening Star" contained an article which reflected that Von Neumann testified before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations in June, 1954. The article further revealed that this testimony was released to the public on October 19, 1954, and indicated that Von Neumann criticized the Government's security program.

A supplemental letter reflecting the appointee's testimony before the committee was transmitted to the White House and the Attorney General on October 21, 1954, and copies of the letter were furnished to the above-mentioned agencies.

A copy of the summary and the supplemental letter are attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE BY

77-64804-29

ALL

b7c Attachment

OCT 29 1954

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WASH "Post" 10/24/54

# The Names Scientist As Member of AEC



International News  
DR. JOHN von NEUMANN  
... appointed to AEC .

## Von Neumann Named AEC Commissioner

Associated Press

President Eisenhower yesterday named a 50-year-old mathematics professor, Dr. John von Neumann, to the remaining vacancy on the five-man Atomic Energy Commission.

A naturalized American who was born in Budapest, Hungary, Von Neumann succeeds Eugene M. Zuckert in the \$18,000-a-year post for a five-year term ending June 30, 1959. Zuckert left when his term expired last June 30.

Von Neumann has compiled a distinguished record as a scientist and has been a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J., since 1933.

Director of the Institute is Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the pioneer atomic scientist who was declared a security risk by the Commission last June. He had been an adviser to the Commission. The Institute is not a part of Princeton University.

The White House listed Von Neumann as a political independent, which makes the new Commission lineup three Republicans, one Democrat and one independent. The law does not require any specific political ratio among the Commissioners. The only Democrat, Thomas E. Murray, is the sole remaining appointee of former President Truman.

Von Neumann is the second current member of the commission to have a scientific background. The other is Dr. Willard Frank Libby, a University of Chicago atomic scientist appointed to succeed Dr. Henry D. Smyth last September 30.

Both nominations must be passed on by the Senate.

Von Neumann became a naturalized citizen on August 1, 1937. Besides achievements in the scientific and educational fields, he has served on a number of Government advisory groups including the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission and, as chairman of a nuclear weapons panel, on the Air Force's Scientific Advisory Board. He also has been a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency.

### Von Neumann Restates Faith in Oppenheimer

PRINCETON, N. J., Oct. 23 (AP)—Dr. John Von Neumann was one of 26 members of the Institute for Advanced Study who issued a statement last June saying their confidence in the loyalty of Institute Director J. Robert Oppenheimer had not been shaken by his loss of Government security clearance.

Von Neumann said today following his appointment as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission that he stands by the statement signed then. He said he would ask for a leave of absence to take up his new duties if his appointment is confirmed, but would not resign from the Institute.

Washington "Post"  
10/24/54

John Von Neumann  
Special Inquiry

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SUNDAY "STAR" 10/24/54

# Defender of Dr. Oppenheimer Named Atomic Commissioner

## Dr. Von Neumann, Princeton Scientist, Urged H-Bomb Use

By L. Edgar Prina

Dr. John Von Neumann, a defender of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer and a critic of the Administration's personnel security program, yesterday was appointed to the Atomic Energy Commission for a five-year term by President Eisenhower.

The 50-year-old mathematics professor at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, N. J., one of the few top atomic scientists who advocated an all-out hydrogen bomb effort, thus became Gen. Eisenhower's fourth appointee to the AEC.

Selection of Dr. Von Neumann brings the commission to its full membership of five for the first time since Eugene Zuckert's term expired last June 30.

Three Republicans, all appointed by Gen. Eisenhower, currently are serving: Chairman Lewis L. Strauss, Joseph Campbell and Dr. Willard F. Libby. Thomas F. Murray, a Truman choice, is the only Democrat.



—AP Photo.

DR. JOHN VON NEUMANN.

Dr. Von Neumann describes himself as an independant.

With the new member, the AEC will have two scientist commissioners serving simultaneously. The other one is Dr. Libby, a chemistry professor on leave from the University of Chicago.

Dr. Von Neumann is a native of Hungary and became nat-

(See VON NEUMANN, Pg. A-7.)

## Von Neumann

(Continued From First Page.)

uralized in 1937. He has been a member of the General Advisory Committee of the AEC since 1952, a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency, president of the American Mathematical Society and a member of the scientific advisory board of the Air Force.

He worked at the Los Alamos atomic bomb laboratory from 1943 to 1945.

### Testified for Oppenheimer.

Testifying at the security hearing for Dr. Oppenheimer last April, Dr. Von Neumann said that he had no doubt as to the loyalty of the wartime director of Los Alamos, whom he first

met in Germany in 1926. He said he did not consider Dr. Oppenheimer a security risk.

Dr. Oppenheimer later was adjudged a security risk by the AEC and his clearance for classified Government information was suspended. He recently was re-elected director of the Institute for Advanced Study.

Dr. Von Neumann, who was called as a witness by Dr. Oppenheimer, also testified at the hearing that his associate took the decision for an all-out H-bomb program "with very good grace and co-operated."

The new commissioner had been asked whether Dr. Oppenheimer was holding back in the effort to develop the bomb. He added that Dr. Oppenheimer gave "very constructive" help.

Dr. Oppenheimer attempted to persuade him to accept his view that an all-out program should not be undertaken, he said, but denied that there was any "pressure" exerted.

Asked about the Chevalier incident which involved an approach to Dr. Oppenheimer in 1943 for information which was to be passed on to the Russians, Dr. Von Neumann replied:

"Look, you have to view the performance and character of a man as a whole. This episode, if true, would make me think that . . . in 1942 and 1943, he was not emotionally and intellectually prepared to handle this kind of a job: that he subsequently learned to handle it, and handled it very well. I know.

"Unknown Universe."

"I would say that all of us in the war years . . . I mean all people in scientific technical occupations got suddenly in contact with a universe we had not known before . . .

"We were involved in a triangular war and two of our enemies had done suddenly the nice thing of fighting each other. . . This was a very peculiar situation.

"None of us had been educated or conditioned to exist in this situation, and we had to make our rationalization and our code of conduct as we went along."

Last June before the House Government Operations Committee, Dr. Von Neumann had some sharp criticism of the personnel security system.

### "Legal No-Man's Land."

"Right now we are with security in a legal no-man's land," he said, recommending the Congress enact legislation to remove the security program "from the administrative to the judicial area."

He said that there is a "very disturbing" situation because many people "who have a trivial blot way back in their past do not know whether they can take a chance on getting into sensitive work, although the matter may be irrelevant, and they could do very good work in the area."

Dr. Von Neumann took sharp issue, however, with the asser-

tion of Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution that the wartime partnership between military and science has been "almost destroyed" by the security program.

"If anything, it is better," Dr. Von Neumann said of relations between the armed services and the scientific community.

Gen. Eisenhower appointed Dr. Edwin M. McMillan, physics professor at the University of California, to fill Dr. Von Neumann's post with the GAC.

He also named Dr. Warren C. Johnson, head of the University of Chicago chemistry department, to the GAC. Both terms are to expire August 1, 1960.

*Washington  
"Sunday Star"  
10/24/54  
John Von*

*Neumann  
S.P.I.*

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